What Did the Lawyers Do During the 'War' ? Neutrality, Conflict and the Culture of Quietism by McEvoy, Kieran
What Did the Lawyers Do During the 'War' ?  Neutrality, Conflcit
and the Culture of Quietism
McEvoy, K. (2011). What Did the Lawyers Do During the 'War' ?  Neutrality, Conflcit and the Culture of Quietism.
The Modern Law Review , 74 (3), 350-384. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2230.2011.00851.x
Published in:
The Modern Law Review
Document Version:
Early version, also known as pre-print
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
What Did the Lawyers Do During the ‘War’? Neutrality,
Con£ict and the Culture of Quietism
KieranMcEvoyn
Using Northern Ireland as a case study, this paper explores how lawyers responded to the chal-
lenges of entrenched discrimination, sustained political violence and an emerging peace process.
Drawing upon the literature of the sociology of lawyering, it examines whether lawyers can or
should be more than‘paid technicians’ in such circumstances. It focuses in particular upon a num-
ber of ‘critical junctures’ in the legal history of the jurisdiction and uncouples key elements of the
local legal culturewhich contributed to an ethos of quietism.The paper argues that the version of
legal professionalism that emerged in Northern Ireland was contingent and socially constructed
and, with notable exceptions, obfuscated a collective failure of moral courage. It concludes that
facing the truth concerning past silence is fundamental to a properly embedded rule of law and a
more grounded notion of what it means to be a lawyer in a con£ict.
INTRODUCTION
In his analysis of the role of law in the South African con£ict and transition,
Richard Abel quipped that one of the reasons why it was so well studied was
that it was the ¢rst such struggle to ‘happen in English’.1Northern Ireland quali-
¢ed for a similarly close analysis. For legal academics, the jurisdiction has o¡ered
a particularly rich site for theoretical and doctrinal analysis.2 However,
whilst the centrality of law to both the con£ict and peace process have beenwell
nProfessor of Law and Transitional Justice, Law School, Queens University Belfast. I received very
helpful comments from two anonymous referees, as well as academic colleagues after presentations
of di¡erent versions of the paper at Queen’s University Belfast, the University of Liverpool, the Uni-
versity of Oxford and the University of Manchester. Brice Dickson, Ron Dudai, Colin Harvey, John
Jackson, Louise Mallinder, John Morison, Hannah Quirk and Marny Requa all provided detailed
comments on previous drafts, and Rachel ReboucheŁ , Alex Schwartz and Louise Mallinder supplied
excellent research assistance. The sta¡ at the Queen’s and University of Ulster libraries, Linenhall
Library, Public Records O⁄ce and Bar Library were helpful in facilitating the archival work.Thanks
are also due to Atlantic Philanthropies which funded the research, the judges and lawyers who were
interviewed and to Brona Heinz for her archival materials on the Northern Ireland Association of
Socialist Lawyers. Other lawyers also gave me access to their own personal archives on the basis of
strictest con¢dentiality and I am grateful for their trust. Finally the article is drawn from a larger com-
parative project whichwas begunwith mymentor Stephen Livingstone. Stephen, himself an immen-
sely talented lawyer, died tragically in 2004. I would like to dedicate this article to his memory.
1 R. Abel, Politics By Other Means: Law and the Struggle Against Apartheid in South Africa 1980^1994
(London: Routledge,1995).
2 eg G. Hogan and C.Walker, PoliticalViolence and the Law in Ireland (Manchester: Manchester Uni-
versity Press,1989); J. Jackson and S. Doran, JudgeWithoutJury: DiplockTrials in theAdversarial System
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); J. Morison and S. Livingstone, Reshaping Public Power:
Northern Ireland and the BritishConstitutionalCrisis (London: Sweet andMaxwell,1995); B. Dickson,
The EuropeanConvention onHumanRights and theNorthern IrelandCon£ict (Oxford: OxfordUniver-
sity Press, 2010).
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explored,3 comparatively little has beenwritten about the lawyerswhoworked in
the system and who shaped, challenged and implemented its laws.
Amongst other things, the circumstances of Northern Ireland required lawyers
to consider: their relationships with an emerging civil rights movement; ethical
questions about whether and how to participate in legal proceedings under an
emergency law regime; their responses when their ownmembers became the vic-
tims of paramilitary and state inspired violence; and whether to challenge long
held views as towhat constituted a‘neutral’ legal system. Each of these experiences
speaks forcefully to what Scheingold and Sarat refer to as lawyering as a ‘public
profession’where the contribution to society is more than the acquisition, aggre-
gation and deployment of technical skills.4 Such a perspective challenges the nar-
row version of professionalismwhich focuses exclusively upon legal competence
and instead suggests that lawyers must face ‘head on’ their broader social, political
or moral responsibilities in a society in con£ict.5
This paper arises from a number of practical and scholarly interests concerning
the role and responsibilities of lawyers in con£icted and transitional societies both
inside and outside the courtroom.6 In total, over ¢fty lawyers and judges in
Northern Ireland were interviewed for this paper. Interviews were conducted in
twomain tranches, in 2002^3, and between 2008^2010. All interviews took place
after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, thus subjects were ‘re£ecting
back’ on events which had occurred during the con£ict and early transition. Only
one (a barrister) was interviewed twice.7
3 C. Harvey (ed), Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Hart,
2001); K. McEvoy and J. Morison, ‘Beyond the Constitutional Moment: Law, Transition and
Peacemaking in Northern Ireland’ (2003) 26 Fordham International LawJournal 961; C. Campbell
F. N|¤ AolaŁ in and C.Harvey,‘The Frontiers of Legal Analysis: Reframing theTransition inNorth-
ern Ireland’ (2003) 66 MLR 317.
4 A. Sarat and S. Scheingold, Something to Believe In: Politics, Professionalism and Cause-Lawyering (Palo
Alto CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 2004) 23.
5 A. Sarat and S. Scheingold ‘Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of Professional Authority’ in
A. Sarat and S. Scheingold (eds),Cause Lawyering: Political Commitments and Professional Responsibil-
ities (NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press,1998) 3.
6 eg K. McEvoy, ‘Law, Struggle, and Political Transformation in Northern Ireland’ (2000) 27 JLS
542; K. McEvoy, ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional Justice’
(2007) 34 JLS 411.
7 Those interviewed included 12 judges, 18 barristers (9 of whom were QCs), 21 solicitors and a
number of o⁄cials associatedwith the Law Society,Director of Public Prosecutions, Bar Council
andNorthern Ireland Service. Unless interviewees indicated that they wished their comments to
be explicitly attributed, interviews were conducted on conditions of con¢dentiality and anon-
ymity. Interviews were semi-structured, framed around key human rights and historical themes
and usually lasted1^2 hours. A‘purposeful sampling’methodology was deployedwhere intervie-
wees were chosen using a range of criteria including professional seniority, experience of work-
ing on con£ict or human rights related cases or knowledge and experience of debates within the
professional groupings.Therewas amore or less even divide amongst the barristers between those
who had acted as defence lawyers or prosecutors (or in some cases both) and a number of the
judges were also former prosecuting counsel. An initial ‘wish list’ of key interviewees was drawn
up, these were written to and, after some negotiation, almost all agreed to be interviewed. Once
¢eldworkwas commenced, others were recruited using ‘snowball’ referrals to professional friends
and colleagues. There are well-established challenges to an exclusive focus on ‘elite level’ inter-
views such as these, usually concerning access, interviewee skills at avoiding di⁄cult or challen-
ging questions and the danger of over-representing hegemonic understandings of historical
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The structure of this article is as follows: section one o¡ers a brief outline of the
relevant literature from the sociology of lawyering and the theoretical insights
which may be derived from exploring ‘critical junctures’ in the legal history of a
jurisdiction. Section two examines the era of the civil rights movement and the
introduction and operation of internment without trial, characterising it as a per-
iod of failed mobilisation in the legal community. Section three charts the role and
response of lawyers to Emergency Laws as a key element of the state’s strategy to
cope with sustained political violence and the introduction of non-jury Diplock
courts.This phase is framed as an examination of the politics of silence. Section four
explores the response of the legal community to attacks upon their ownmembers
and challenges from fellow lawyers to the prevailing British and Unionist ethos
of the judicial system.The painfully slow transition from indefensible silence to a
principled position in favour of the rights of defence lawyers is tentatively
described as the emergence of a collective legal conscience. The article concludes by
uncoupling the key elements of the local legal culture and its relationship to the
particular political/historical context of the jurisdiction. It argues that an appro-
priately nuanced usage of the post-colonial lens of historical and sociological
scholarship provides insights into how that culture shaped the prevailing ethos
of quietism. It concludes that a more truthful understanding of past silence is a
fundamental pre-requisite to a properly embedded rule of law and a more
grounded notion of legal professionalism.
LAWYERINGAND CRITICAL JUNCTURES
Rather than o¡ering an exhaustive account of the historyof lawyering during the
Northern Ireland con£ict, I explore in some detail certain‘critical junctures’which
speak to some of the broader themes being examined. In order to frame those
discussions properly, in particular the distinct notion of professionalism which
came to the fore, I draw upon some of the key ideas from the relevant literature
on lawyering.The three themes of most pertinence to the Northern Ireland con-
text are: the relationship between lawyers and the state; the experiences of ‘cause
lawyering’wherein lawyers abandon the traditional position that law and lawyers
can be divorced from politics and the question of how well or otherwise lawyers
perform in the context of political violence and state repression.
events unchallenged by critical perspectives ‘from below’. However, in this study, access proved
largely unproblematic, interviews were supplemented by extensive archival research and the
author (and others) had previously conducted extensive research on those directly a¡ected by
the legal process during the Northern Ireland con£ict. In that context, interviewswith legal elites
were adjudged themost appropriatemeans to understand the broader political, social and cultural
forces at work within the professional community. For similar methodologies deployed with
lawyers, see E. Smigel,TheWall Street Lawyer: A Professional Organizational Man? (Bloomington
IA: Indiana University Press, 1969) and C. Shdaimah, ‘Dilemmas of Progressive Lawyering:
Empowerment and Hierarchy’ in A. Sarat and S. Scheingold (eds),TheWorld Cause Lawyers Make
(Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2005). For a more general discussion of relevant design
challenges see S.Merriam,QualitativeResearch: AGuide toDesign and Implementation (San Francisco
CA:Wiley, 2009), and L. Dexter, Elites and Specialised Interviewing (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2006).
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Rooted variously in theWeberian, Marxist and Durkheimian traditions, there
is a rich literature usually referred to as the sociology of lawyering which exam-
ines amongst other things the education, mores, values, working practices, sys-
tems of self-regulation, e¡orts to sustain the monopoly in service delivery and
social status of lawyers.8 As with the sociology of the professions in general,9 a
central theme of much of this literature concerns the relationship between the
legal profession and the state. As Burrage has outlined, the distinctive characteris-
tics of legal professions in di¡erent countries are intimately linked to their respec-
tive histories of state formation and the practical and symbolic relationship
between the legal profession and the state.10 Certainly in Northern Ireland that
relationshipwas absolutely central in the development of the local legal culture.
There is a growing literature which addresses the challenges of the professional
roles and responsibility of lawyers in con£icted societies, such as South Africa,11
Latin America,12 Israel and the Occupied Territories13 and America post the 9/11
attacks.14 The experiences of lawyers whowork ‘at the sharp end’ in some of these
countries and who must discern and act upon their professional responsibilities
when the rule of law is a such a keenly contested space speaks directly to the
Northern Ireland context.15
8 For an overview see J. Heinz andE. Laumann,ChicagoLawyers:TheSocial Structure of theChicagoBar
(NewYork: Russell Sage Foundation,1983);T. Halliday, BeyondMonopoly: Lawyers, State Crises and
Professional Empowerment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); R. Abel (ed), Lawyers: A
Critical Reader (NewYork:The New Press,1997); R. Abel, English Lawyers BetweenMarket and State:
The Politics of Professionalism (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2004); L. Fox (ed), Raising the Bar:
RealWord Solutions for aTroubled Profession (Chicago: American BarAssociation, 2007).
9 See egT. Johnson, Professions andPower (London:Macmillan,1972); K.MacDonald,TheSociology of
the Professions (London: Sage, 1995); J. Evetts et al, ‘Sociological Theories of Professions: Con£ict,
Competition and Cooperation’ in A. Dennis and I. Kalekin-Fishman (eds),The ISA Handbook in
Contemporary Sociology (London: Sage, 2009).
10 M. Burrage, Revolution and the Making of the Contemporary Legal Profession: England, France, and the
United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also D. Sugarman andW. Pue (eds),
Lawyers andVampires: Cultural Histories of Legal Professions (Oxford: Hart, 2003).
11 See Abel, n 1 above; S. Ellman, ‘Law and Legitimacy in South Africa’ (1995) 20 Law and Social
Inquiry 407; D. Dyzenhaus, Judging theJudges, Judging Ourselves:Truth, Reconciliation and theApartheid
Legal Order (Oxford: Hart,1998).
12 See egY. Dezaley and B. Garth,The Internationalization of PalaceWars: Lawyers, Economists and the
Contest toTransform Latin American States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); R. PeŁ rez
Perdomo, Latin American Lawyers; A Historical Introduction (Stanford: Standford University Press,
2006).
13 See R. Brooks, ‘The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the ‘‘Rule Of Law’’’ (2003) 101
Michigan LR 2275.
14 See eg A. Dershowitz,WhyTerrorismWorks: Understanding theThreat, Responding to the Challenge
(New Haven:Yale University Press, 2002) esp chs 4 and 5; R.Weisberg, ‘Loose Professionalism,
orWhy Lawyers Take the Lead onTorture’ in S. Levinson (ed),Torture: A Collection (NewYork:
Oxford University Press, 2004); R. Bilder and D. F.Vagts, ‘Speaking Truth to Power: Lawyers
and Torture’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 689; D. Luban, ‘Lawyers and Legal
Ethics in Guantanamo’ (2007) 60 Stanford LR 1981; A. Meyerstein, ‘The Law and Lawyers as
Enemy Combatants’ (2007) 18 University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy 299; M. Cheh,
‘Should Lawyers Participate in Rigged Systems? The Case of Military Commissions’ (2007) 1
Journal ofNational Security LawandPolicy 375; H. Bru¡, BadAdvice: Bush’s Lawyers and theWar onTerror
(Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press, 2009).
15 For the classic discussion on contested understandings of the rule of law see O. Kirchheimer, Poli-
tical Justice:The Use of Legal Procedure for Political Ends (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press,
1961).
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A central concern in such sites is the extent to which law can form part of
broader resistance or, perhaps more accurately, mobilisation strategies. ‘Cause-
lawyering’ is the genre of scholarship most associated with this style of analysis.
Sarat and Scheingold in particular have mapped out a rich terrain of comparative
work which explores the ways in which lawyers challenge prevailing political,
social, moral or legal power.16 While de¢nitional wrangles persist,17 at its core
cause lawyering is a form of ‘moral activism’wherein committed lawyers ‘do more’
than simply deploy their technical services on behalf of their client. The
common thread which links these lawyers is an abandonment of the traditional
disavowal of the politics of legality through, for example, pro bonowork, strategic
litigation, styles of argumentation and public mobilisation beyond the courtroom.
Cause lawyers are essentially more open to the view that the professional is
indeed political.18
Of course, as one raises the notion of cause lawyering in the Northern Irish
context, the immediate question is ‘which cause?’ While other political con£icts
have occasionally produced lawyers who explicitly aligned themselves with the
political or military ‘struggle’ of particular groups,19 this did not occur in North-
ern Ireland. The consequences discussed below concerning public a⁄liations to
either violent Republicanism or Loyalism in such a small jurisdictionwere genu-
ine. While Republican and Loyalist defendants gravitated towards particular
solicitor ¢rms and requested particular barristers to act for them, often the
lawyers were at pains to stress their willingness to represent people from ‘either
community’. As one barrister recounted:
I have represented both Republican and Loyalist defendants and I never made any
distinction between them . . . It is true, however, that a preponderance of the con-
£ict related defendants I represented were actually Loyalists who I would say knew
my [Catholic] background. In part it may have been the particular ¢rms who
instructed me. Also if you do a decent job for someone one time he is up he may
ask for you or tell his friends.There may also be a sense inwhich sometimes Loyal-
ists appeared to believe that Catholic lawyersweremorewilling to go the extramile
for them, less deferential to authority or willing to exercise our supposed Jesuitical
skills [laughs] in their defence.20
Although attacks on lawyers were not as widespread as in other con£ict zones,
the threat to some lawyers and especially their judicial colleagues was
16 S. Scheingold,The Politics of Rights: Lawyers, Public Policy, and Political Change (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 2nd ed, 2004); A. Sarat and S. Scheingold (eds), n 5 above; A. Sarat and S. Schein-
gold (eds),Cause Lawyering and the State in aGlobal Era (NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press, 2001);
S. Scheingold and A. Sarat, n 4 above; A. Sarat and S. Scheingold (eds), Cause Lawyers and Social
Movements (PaloAlto CA: StanfordUniversity Press, 2006).
17 See egT. Halliday, L. Karpik andM. Feeley,‘The Legal Complex and Struggles for Political Lib-
eralism’ inT. Halliday, L. Karpik andM. Feeley (eds), Fighting for Political Freedom: Comparative Stu-
dies of the Legal Complex and Political Liberalism (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).
18 See R. Abel, ‘The Professional is Political’ (2004) 11 International Journal for the Study of the Legal
Profession 131.
19 See eg S. Aust, Baeder Meinhof:The Inside Story of the R.A.F. (NewYork: OxfordUniversity Press,
3rd ed, 2009) esp part four.
20 Interview barrister 23 June 2008.
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signi¢cant.21The relevance of cause-lawyering to Northern Ireland is through its
framework for examining the social and political processes by which organised
voices emerge (or fail to emerge) from the legal profession in defence of the rule
of law, in response to attacks on the profession itself or in the promotion of inter-
national human rights standards ^ all ostensibly small ‘p’political themes around
which it would seem more straightforward for lawyers to coalesce.
The key phases in Northern Ireland which are examined below are referred to
as ‘critical junctures’.22 This notion is drawn from the political science literature on
historical institutionalism, which analyses the construction, maintenance and
adaptation of particular institutions (such as legal systems) and the ways inwhich
these shape and are shaped by the social and political world.23 One important var-
iant of this work constructs analytical narratives of empirical events and theorises
about their signi¢cance. Since historical institutionalists ‘take time seriously’, they
are often drawn to‘critical junctures’ in the history of any institutions.24 A critical
juncture may be brief, or stretch over a period of several years in which institu-
tions go through a process of what Mahoney refers to as ‘reorientation’.25 In such
periods of reorientation, fundamental questions may be asked and the legitimacy
of the existing order is sometimes undermined to the extent that a ‘paradigm
change’ ensues in politics, policy or ideas about how things should be done.26 In
others, the status quo remains unaltered.27 Nonetheless, these critical junctures
allow us to seemore readily how the actors in a given institution perform‘under
pressure’, the power relations within and without the institution and the ways in
21 During the con£ict judges were by far the most likely to be attacked by paramilitaries. At least 18
Republican paramilitary attacks were carried out against the judiciary, resulting in themurders of
two magistrates, two county court judges, and Gibson LJ and his wife as well as one member of
the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) o⁄ce. Politically active lawyers were also targeted. For
example, the IRA murdered Unionist politician and law lecturer Edgar Graham and Loyalists
killed law student and Sinn FeŁ in activist Sheena Campbell. These instances aside however, part
of the shock provoked by the killing of solicitor Pat Finucane (discussed below) was that until
then, lawyers had been broadly viewed as ‘o¡-limits’ by both Republicans and Loyalists. Inter-
view Director of Public Prosecutions and sta¡, 12 November 2002. See also C. Blair, Judicial
Appointments: Research Report 5 Criminal Justice Review of Northern Ireland (Belfast: HMSO,
2000) 29.
22 For a fuller discussion of the analytical utility of critical junctures (concerning the role of bar
councils and law societies in a range of jurisdictions) see K. McEvoy and R. ReboucheŁ ,‘Mobilis-
ing the Professions: Lawyers, Politics and the Collective Legal Conscience’ in J. Morison,
K.McEvoy and G. Anthony (eds), Judges,Transition andHumanRights (Oxford: OxfordUniversity
Press, 2007).
23 K.Thelen, S. Steinmo and F. Lonstreth (eds), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Com-
parative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); K. Thelen, ‘Historical Institu-
tionalism in Comparative Politics’ (1999) 2 Annual Review of Political Science 369; E. Sanders,
‘Historical Institutionalism’ in R. Rhodes, S. Binder and B. Rockman (eds),TheOxfordHandbook
of Political Science (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 2006).
24 P. Pierson, Politics inTime:History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniver-
sity Press, 2004).
25 J. Mahoney,‘Path Dependent Explanations of Regime Change: Central America in Comparative
Perspective’ (2001) 36 Studies in Comparative International Development111.
26 J.W. Hogan,‘Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach’ (2006) 39 Canadian Journal of Political
Science 657; J. Hogan and D. Doyle, ‘A Comparative Framework: How Broadly Applicable is a
‘‘Rigorous’’Critical Junctures Framework?’ (2009) 44Acta Politica 211.
27 G. Capoccia and R. Kelemen,‘The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Narrative, and Counter-
factuals in Historical Institutionalism’ (2007) 59World Politics 341.
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which a particular institutional self image is constructed and reproduced in the
organisational and societal memory.28
Choosing which key events to focus upon in the complex history of any insti-
tution is inevitably subjective. Rather than using complex grids, sets of predictors
or pathway dependency models as external ‘validators’,29 I was drawn to the per-
spective that the actors themselves are key to de¢ning the critical phases of their
institutional history and how these speak to the broader political and social his-
tory of the society inwhich it is located.30 Awidespread consensus emerged from
the ¢eldwork that the relevant critical junctures in Northern Ireland were: the
civil rights campaign, the Emergency Law regime, the murder of two prominent
solicitors and the dispute concerning the Declaration for becoming a Queen’s
Counsel.31 Each is discussed below.
CIVILRIGHTSAND FAILEDMOBILISATION
A detailed outline of the origins and history of the civil rights movement in
Northern Ireland is beyond the scope of this paper.32 In brief, following partition
of the island of Ireland in 1921, Northern Ireland was governed as a de facto one-
party state, controlled by successive Unionist governments. Facilitated by a con-
stitutional practice which emerged thatWestminster did not normally ‘discuss’ the
domestic a¡airs of Northern Ireland,33 Unionist governments essentially ignored
the Nationalist/Catholic parliamentary opposition.34 Most aspects of civic and
political life in the jurisdiction, including policing and security policy, were char-
acterised by a spectrum of institutional and casual sectarianism and discrimina-
tion against Catholics whose ‘loyalty’ to the Union could never be trusted.35
These factors contributed directly to the rise of the civil rights movement in the
1960s in the period before the outbreak of sustained political violence in 1969.36
28 R. B. Collier and D. Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and
RegimeDynamics in Latin America (Notre Dame IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002).
29 See Hogan and Doyle, n 26 above.
30 See espM.Halbwachs,OnCollectiveMemory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, translated by
L. A. Coser, 1992) and R. Narvaez,‘Embodiment, Collective Memory andTime’ (2006) 12 Body
and Society 51.
31 It could be argued that the consensus amongst the interviewees was a re£ection of the sampling
methodology. As was noted above the vast majority of those judges and lawyers interviewed had
direct experience of con£ict related cases, criminal work and/or human rights litigation.
Undoubtedly the vantage point of a sample of property or tax lawyers on what constituted the
key legal events of the past forty years would have been di¡erent although perhaps of less obvious
relevance to the broader parameters of the con£ict which is the focus of this paper.
32 For an overview see B. Purdie, Politics in the Streets:TheOrigins of theCivil RightsMovement inNorth-
ern Ireland (Belfast: Blacksta¡ Press, 1990); N. OŁ Dochartaigh, From Civil Rights toArmalites: Derry
and the Birth of the IrishTroubles (Cork: CorkUniversity Press,1997).
33 H. Calvert, Constitutional Law inNorthern Ireland (London: Stevens and Sons,1968).
34 E. Phoenix, Northern Nationalism: Nationalist Politics, Partition and the Catholic Minority in Northern
Ireland (Belfast: Ulster Historical Association,1994) 368.
35 K. McEvoy and C.White, ‘Loyalty, Redress and Citizenship: SecurityVetting in Northern Ire-
land’ (1998) 61MLR 341.
36 M. Farrell,Northern Ireland:The Orange State (London: Pluto Press, 2nd ed,1980).
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The Northern Ireland civil rights movement was also in£uenced by events else-
where in the 1960s. In particular, the inspiration drawn from the American civil
rights movement has been well documented.37 Many of those taking part in civil
rights marches drew analogies between the plight of the Catholic minority in
Northern Ireland and the experience of African Americans across the Atlantic.38
They adopted similar tactics such as sit-ins, marches, and public demonstrations
designed to expose the sectarianism of the police.39 What is of particular interest
for current purposes, is that unlike theirAmerican counterparts, neither law nor law-
yers played a particularly signi¢cant role in the civil rights struggle in Northern Ire-
land.40 While individual campaign groupings demonstrated di¡ering attitudes
towards the use of law, none appeared toviewlegal challenges as central to delivering
upon their objectives.The attitudes of a number of key organisations are instructive.
One of the ¢rst signi¢cant organisations to emerge in the Northern Ireland civil
rightsmovementwas theDungannon-basedCampaign for Social Justice (CSJ).This
group, made up largely of middle-class professionals, eschewed the traditional
Nationalist grievance of partition and instead focused on issues such as housing, dis-
crimination, and police brutality.Their strategy was to lobby politicians and public
opinion (particularly in Britain) through pamphlets and a regular newsletter.They
spent considerable time gathering evidence of discrimination and other Unionist
malpractices.Thesewere eventually presented to the British PrimeMinister, SirAlec
Douglas-Home in 1964. Douglas-Home responded that they should seek redress in
the courts.41 In response, the CSJ sought legal aid to challenge the housing allocation
policy of Dungannon Council as discriminatory. However, their application was
turned down by the Legal Aid Committee of the Law Society and again upon
appeal on technical grounds.42
The CSJ made one other signi¢cant e¡ort to pursue legal redress, through the
European Court of Human Rights. Assisted by an Irish American lawyer, it
lodged six applications between April and June 1968, suggesting inter alia that the
aspects of the Special Powers Acts (NI) 1922^43, the electoral arrangements and
discrimination in housing, education, employment and other aspects of public life
37 See eg B. Devlin,The Price of My Soul (London: Pan Books Ltd, 1969); C. McCluskey, Up O¡
Their Knees: A Commentary on the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland (Dungannon: Conn
McCluskey and Associates, 1989); M. Dooley, Black and Green:The Fight for Civil Rights in Northern
Ireland and Black America (London: Pluto,1998).
38 Aphotograph of a parade in Dugannon in 1963 saw two little boys, one with his faced blackened
holding a placard which read ‘We are pals from Alabama,Where they say we cant agree, is there
really much di¡erence,When you look at him and me.’DungannonObserver 21September 1963.
39 G.M.Maney,‘Transnational Mobilization and Civil Rights in Northern Ireland’ (2000) 47 Social
Problems 153.
40 While the strained relations between the cause lawyers of the National Association for the
Advancement of Coloured People (NAACP) and other more radical organisations in the US are
well established, even the more sceptical commentators would acknowledge that lawyers were
‘instrumental in constituting the civil rights movement’: Sarat and Scheingold (2006), n16 above,
7. For an important critique of the ‘overselling’ of the importance of lawyering in the US civil
rights movement, see K. Mack, ‘Rethinking Civil Rights Lawyering and Politics in the Era
Before Brown’ (2005) 115 Yale LJ 256.
41 Campaign for Social Justice,Northern Ireland:The PlainTruth (Dungannon: CSJ,1964).
42 The grounds were that the applicant concerned was not claiming personal discrimination in the
allocation of housing. See Dickson, n 2 above 45.
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were in breach of various articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights.These e¡orts to use the courts failed, according to theCSJ, becauseNorth-
ern Irish solicitors were unable or unwilling to take such cases and because the
relationship with their American lawyer ultimately proved unworkable.43 In the
CJS pamphlets and newsletters, a sense of frustration at the limitations of legal
redress is augmented by a palpable sense of exasperationwith lawyers per se.44
Other groups within the Northern Irish civil rights movement appeared to
have similar attitudes towards legal actions. For example, the archives fromgroups
such as the Derry Citizens’Action Committee (DCAC), Derry Housing Action
Committee (DHAC), and the People’s Democracy (PD) reveal little sustained
attention to litigation as part of the overall civil rights struggle. Activists such as
Eamon McCann (prominent in DHAC) were aware of the potential of court
cases as symbolic platforms for publicity. For example, following his arrest and
conviction for a housing related protest, he explained, ‘The court proceedings
provided us with a platform; ¢nes and suspended sentences conferred on us an
aura of minor martyrdom’.45 As in the case of McCann, it would appear that the
courts were generally viewed as useful propagandist by-products of the direct
action campaigns, rather than as elements of an overarching legal strategy which
might delivermaterial bene¢ts. As another prominent civil rights activist toldme:
I suppose it is true to say that unlike in theUS,we didn’t hold outmuch hope of going
to court.The courts were seen very much as part and parcel of theUnionist establish-
ment. Legal Aidwasn’t as readily available and apart froma fewhonourable exceptions,
I don’t remember lawyers tripping over themselves to do pro-bonowork.46
Even civil rights organisations with an ostensibly legal bent appeared in practice
to place little faith in legal forms of redress.The largest and best known of these
was the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) established in 1967.
Its constitutionwas borrowed from the London-based National Council of Civil
Liberties and, on paper at least, it mirrored NCCL’s focus on legal and constitu-
tional rights.47 For the ¢rst year and a half of its life, widely regarded as ‘a period of
general ine¡ectuality’, much of NICRA’s time was spent in letter writing cam-
paigns to theNorthern Ireland government.48 Little e¡ort was devoted to seeking
out appropriate cases to advance the civil rights agenda.49 In January1969NICRA
lodged an application with the European Commission on Human Rights
together with six other applicants alleging that their right to demonstrate
had been violated by the banning of a civil rights march in Derry and the police
43 CSJ,Northern Ireland:TheMailed Fist (Dungannon: CSJ and theAssociation for Legal Justice,1972).
44 See eg CSJ,Northern Ireland Legal Aid to Oppose Discrimination: Not Likely (Dungannon: CSJ,1966).
45 E. McCann,War and an IrishTown (Harmondsworth: Penguin,1974) 35.
46 Interview with Northern Ireland Solicitor, 8 February 2010.
47 The ¢ve objectives of the Association were to defend the basic freedom of all citizens; to protect
the rights of the individual; to highlight all possible abuses of power; to demand guarantees for
freedom of speech, assembly and association; and to inform the public of their lawful rights.
NICRA,We Shall Overcome:The History of the Struggle for Civil Rights in Northern Ireland, 1968^1978
(Belfast: NICRA,1978).
48 Purdie, n 32 above 133.
49 ibid 133.
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failure to protect marchers in Armagh.50 Ultimately these applications were
removed from the list because the Commission determined ‘the applicants have
shown a clear lack of interest in pursuing these applications.’51
Itwould bewrong togive the impression that lawyerswere entirely silent during
these formative years of the civil rights era. Some practicing and academic lawyers
including Paddy McGrory, Kevin Boyle, Harry Calvert and others provided free
legal advice to CCJ and other groups. Some practicising lawyers did march with
the student-led People’s Democracy and some of the student leaders later became
prominent barristers or solicitors including Eilis McDermott, Sean McCann and
Michael Farrell. Apart from these few individual contemporary or future lawyers,
perhaps the best known collective intervention by lawyers of this era was the
Northern Ireland Society of Labour Lawyers (NISLL).
The NISLLwas formed in 1966 as an o¡shoot of the Society of Labour Law-
yers in England as a left-leaning and pro-Union (with Britain) organisation,
a⁄liatedwith theNorthern Ireland Labour Party. It involved some solicitors, bar-
risters and a fewacademics.NISLL’smost visible activitywas producing a series of
political pamphlets on issues, such as the ‘Special Powers Act’,‘Public Order’, and
‘Discrimination’.52 Individual members acted on behalf of people arrested because
of civil rights-related activities, in some instances without being paid.53 The
NISLL remained small and quickly disappeared following the outbreak of sus-
tained political violence in 1970 which led to some members ‘shying back from
politics a bit as people were pigeonholed into the two traditional political
camps’.54 The emergence of the Nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party
also made membership of such a group less attractive to Catholic lawyers.
Despite the activities of those comparatively few committed lawyers advising
the various campaigning organisations, as well as the work of the NISLL
in the late 1960s, it is the comparative absence of lawyerly mobilisation or indeed
signi¢cant attention to strategic litigation that is most noteworthy during the
civil rights period. Of course, as a number of lawyers pointed out, the circum-
stances of the time were not entirely conducive to progressive cause-lawyering.
In the mid to late 1960s, compared to Britain, the legal community in
Northern Ireland was relatively small so there were fewer lawyers to be active.
The level of technical skills amongst lawyers, certainly with regard to the
use of the European Convention on Human Rights, was questionable.55
50 Dickson, n 2 above 47.
51 AandOthers vUK (App No 3625 and others) (1970) Ybk 340, 434.
52 Northern Ireland Society of Labour Lawyers (NISLL),AState of Emergency: AReviewof theNorth-
ern Ireland Special Powers Act (Belfast: NISLL, 1969); NISLL, Public Order (Belfast: NISLL, 1969);
NISLL,Discrimination: Pride for Prejudice (Belfast: NISLL,1969). As one foundingmember recalled:
‘They were quite prophetic, they were just small little pamphlets, polemics if you like, that’s all
they were. I don’t think any of us knew what was coming.We were arguing really for the emer-
gency powers to be scaled down and we were arguing for anti-discrimination legislation in the
private and public sector, and I am rather proud that we did that.’ Interview with Northern Ire-
land solicitor, 3 March 2003.
53 Interview with Northern Ireland barrister,14 November 2002.
54 Interview with same Northern Ireland barrister, 14 November 2002.
55 For example Dickson, n 2 above 47, argues that one of the reasons why the cases which the CJS
and NICRA sought to take to Europe ultimately £oundered was that it seemed the lawyers
involved ‘did not do their jobs properly’. He also notes that when the then MP for Mid-Ulster
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Amongst the civil rights groups, there was little faith in the ability of a
Unionist-dominated judiciary to rule in their favour when challenging the
power of the state.56 Certainly the ways in which the courts of the Stormont
era had dealt with challenges to discrimination or abuses of state power suggest
that a degree of cynicism was well grounded.57 The absence of legal aid
until 1965 was also a signi¢cant structural obstacle. Finally, as Dickson has
demonstrated, the capacity of legal system to deliver real change in human rights
terms in Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom during this period was
also restricted.58
Even taking into account all of these factors, the dearth of lawyerly activity
both inside and outside the courts in a society which was otherwise undergoing
such a profound period of civil rights activism remains striking. As noted above,
there arewell-rehearsed tensions in the social movement literaturemore generally
between lawyers and other activists. Often these crystallise around concerns that
lawyers may ‘narrow’the focus of social or political struggles onto overly legalistic
terrain, over-sell the capacity of law to deliver real change or divert organisational
resources away from other mobilising activities.59 Such debates are indicative
however of the substantive in£uence of lawyers in these broader social and poli-
tical movements.They are litigating in the courts but also, in places such as Chile,
South Africa and Pakistan, they are often amongst the most prominent actors
outside the courts in mobilising for political change. The chances of successful
progressive litigation in con£icted societies in particular is almost always curtailed
by reactionary laws or conservative judges. Lawyers in such circumstances expect
to lose more cases than they win, to make progress only ¢tfully and incremen-
tally.They are, however, engaged.With honourable exceptions, this was not parti-
cularly the case inNorthern Ireland.What I have termed a culture of quietismwas
to continue in the legal community as civil rights activism gave way to sustained
political violence and the state responded by expanding and enhancing its exist-
ing emergency powers.
Bernadette Devlin lodged an unsuccessful challenge at Strasbourg against her conviction for rio-
tous behaviour she chose to be represented by a ¢rm of London solicitors.
56 AsHadden andHillyard summarised in1973,‘Of 20 HighCourt judges appointed since the inde-
pendent Northern Ireland courts were established, 15 have been openly associated with
the Unionist party. Of 23 County Court appointments, 14 had been visibly connected with the
Unionist administration. At the height of the civil rights campaign in the late 1960s two of the
three judges in the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal were ex-Attorneys General in Unionist
governments: one of the four High Court judges was likewise an ex-Attorney General, and
another the son of an Attorney General; two of the ¢ve County Court judges were ex-Unionist
MPs and another the son of aUnionistMP, an ex-Unionist Senator, a defeatedUnionist candidate
and a former legal advisor to the Minister of Home A¡airs.’ T. Hadden and P. Hillyard, Justice in
Northern Ireland: A Study in Social Con¢dence (London: CobdenTrust, 1973) 11.
57 See Morison and Livingstone, n 2 above.
58 Dickson, n 2 above.
59 See Scheingold, n16 above. See also R.Rosenbern,TheHollowHope:CanCourts BringAbout Social
Change? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); M. McCann, Pay Equity Reforms and the
Politics of Legal Mobilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); C. Mandfredi, Feminst
Activism in theSupremeCourt: LegalMobilization and theWomen’s Legal Education andAction Fund (Van-
couver: UBC Press, 2004).
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EMERGENCY LAWANDTHE POLITICSOF SILENCE
As is amply demonstrated elsewhere, the ‘emergency’ legal formations which are
introduced in response to political violence o¡er rich potential for analysis of the
legal culture of a given jurisdiction.60 In Northern Ireland, the longevity of emer-
gency powers illustrates the argument that such extra-ordinary powers and pro-
cedures can become all too readily normalised.61 Since the formation of the state,
the authorities in Northern Ireland have had awide array of emergency powers at
their disposal, many of which survived into the direct rule era.62 As far as the
actions of lawyers were concerned, the critical junctures associated with emer-
gency lawduring the Northern Ireland con£ict were the introduction and opera-
tion of internment without trial and the non-jury Diplock trials.
Internment
Regulation12(1) of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland)
1922 (Special Powers Act 1922) authorised the Northern Ireland Minister of
Home A¡airs to issue an Internment Order against a person ‘who is suspected of
acting of having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the preser-
vation of the peace and the maintenance of order in Northern Ireland’. As in the
South, this power of internment was used by the Unionist government between
1921^24, 1938^45 and 1956^61 in response to Republican violence.63 Internment
thus came to be viewed as a practical and symbolic expression of the state’s deter-
mination to‘face down’ the Republican threat.64
Following sustained Unionist pressure, the Heath-led Conservative govern-
ment agreed to the Stormont government’s request to introduce internment in a
mass operation on 9 August 1971. This poorly planned and crudely executed
operationwas disastrous in both security and political terms.65 Much of the intel-
ligence was £awed so that many innocent people were arrested and interned.The
reality of British soldiers and RUC o⁄cers smashing down doors and dragging
suspects from their beds had a predictably alienating e¡ect on relations with the
Catholic community against whom the brunt of the operations were directed.66
Indeed levels of violence increased dramatically following internment.67
60 See egV. Ramraj, M. Hor and K. Roach (eds),Global Anti-terrorism Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2005); D.Dyzenhaus,TheConstitution of Law:Legality in aTime of Emergency (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
61 O.Gross and F. N|¤ AolaŁ in, Law inTimes ofCrisis: Emergency Powers inTheoryandPractice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006) 228.
62 See L. Donohue, Counter-Terrorist Law and Emergency Powers in the United Kingdom 1922^2000
(Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2001).
63 J. McGu⁄n, Internment (Tralee: Anvil Books,1973).
64 J. Bowyer Bell,The IrishTroubles: AGeneration ofViolence 1967^1992 (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan,
1993) 208.
65 See K. McEvoy, Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2001) esp ch 8.
66 E. Mallie and P. Bishop,The Provisional IRA (London: Corgi, 1988).
67 P. Hillyard,‘Political and Social Dimensions of Emergency Law’ in A. Jennings (ed), Justice under
Fire:TheAbuse of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland (London: Pluto Press,1990).
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The legal procedures for processing internees were initially fairly crude. Under
the provisions of the Special PowersAct1922, theMinister forHomeA¡airs (assisted
by an advisory committee of police, army and intelligence ¢gures whose advice he
could reject) issued internment orders. Internees could make legal representations to
that Advisory Committee. After the introduction of direct rule from London, the
British government re¢ned this legislation to include a ‘quasi-judicial element’ with
the introduction of the Detention of Terrorists Order 1972. UnderArticle 4 of that
order, the Secretaryof State could order the‘interim custody’ of a‘suspected terrorist’
for up to 28 days. That detention was then examined by a ‘Commissioner’, a ‘judi-
ciallyquali¢ed person’ appointed by the Secretaryof State. If the Commissioner was
satis¢ed that the suspect was ‘concerned in the commission of or attempted commis-
sion of any act of terrorism, or in the direction, organisation or training of any per-
sons for the purpose of terrorism’ and that ‘his detention was necessary for the
protection of the public’ (Article 12), a detention order could be made for an addi-
tional 12 months, and thereafter reviewed every six months (Article 35 (1) and (2)).
Suspects were entitled to see a copyof the‘charges’ of which theywere accused,
although these often lacked precision.While defendants were entitled to legal
representation much of the procedure of the actual hearings could be left to the
discretion of the Commissioner. Evidence inadmissible in a criminal trial could
be heard and witnesses testifying to the involvement of the individual in ‘terror-
ism’ (usually anRUCo⁄cer) gave their evidence from behind screens.68 At times,
both the suspect and their counsel were excluded from parts of the hearing and
were unable to cross-examine and test the reliability of evidence provided bywit-
nesses who included paid informers.69 In two cases it was con¢rmed by the High
Court of Northern Ireland that, in e¡ect, the only way a detention order could be
challenged in court was by showing that the order had been made in bad faith.70
While internees (or detainees as they became known after 1972) brought a num-
ber of successful civil actions for damages,71most of these focused on physical and
psychological maltreatment during interrogation. In fact they underlined that
such maltreatment did not necessarily negate the lawfulness of the detention.72
Lord Gardiner’s criticisms of the procedures are worth reproducing:
The procedures are unsatisfactory, or even farcical, if considered as judicial. The
adversarial method of the trial is reduced to impotence by the needs of security.
The use of screens and voice scramblers, the overwhelming amount of hearsay evi-
dence and the in camera sessions are totally alien to ordinary trial procedures. The
quasi-judicial procedures are a veneer to an enquiry which, to be e¡ective, inevita-
bly has no relationship to common law procedures.73
68 McGu⁄n, n 63 above.
69 ‘Trial byTittleTattle’SundayTimes 21December 1973.
70 See ReMcEldu¡ [1972] NI 1 and Kelly v Faulkner [1973] NI 31.
71 See egMoore vMinistry ofDefence et al unreported, Armagh County Court10 February1972; Smith
vMinistry for Defence unreported December 1973; Sean Hughes vMinistry of Defence etc 17 October
1972 [NI] 25;OJKelly vMinistry of HomeA¡airs 17 October 1972 [NI] 10; See further B. J. Narain,
Public Law in Northern Ireland (Muckamore: Shanway Services,1975).
72 D. Lowry,‘Internment; DetentionwithoutTrial inNorthern Ireland’ (1976) 5HumanRights 261, 282.
73 Lord Gardiner, Report of a Committee to Consider in the Context of Civil Liberties and Human Rights,
Measures to Deal withTerrorism inNorthern Ireland (London: HMSO,1975) 44.
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Given the nature of the proceedings, lawyers had a choice whether to take part in
internment hearings and thereby legitimise them or to leave clients without legal
representation. Unlike, for example, in the context of the military courts in Israel
where there have been several organised strikes of defence lawyers,74 no similar orga-
nised actions occurred in Northern Ireland. A small number of individual lawyers
expressed their opposition to internment by joining organisations such as the Asso-
ciation for Legal Justice, which lobbied for a boycott of the internment hearings, but
the bulk opted that lawyers should take part.75 As one interviewee recalled:
Internment was a huge event and the Bar was divided . . . I attended a general meet-
ing about whether services should be withdrawn . . . it was ultimately decided that
the services would be continued to be o¡ered. I was of the view that it was permis-
sible within the existing jurisprudence and that we should take part.76
The involvement of lawyers in the internment process was central to its symbolic
and practical functioning and it is clear that the government made considerable
e¡orts to ensure their participation. Internment suspects were entitled to be repre-
sented by a solicitor and counsel of choice, a service provided by the Northern Ire-
land O⁄ce so that no application for legal aid was involved.The remuneration for
this work was quite substantial for the time ^ a joint fee for counsel and solicitor of
d250^d300 per day. Although groups of lawyers periodically threatened to with-
draw their services, in practice the Northern Irish legal profession cooperated in the
system of hearings throughout the period when they were in operation, and were
criticised by a number of commentators for so doing.77 It is hard to quibblewith the
conclusion of Boyle et al that the legal profession’s decision to continue to provide
legal services was in part due to the lawyers’ genuine desire to assist their clients and
. . .‘also in part due to the very substantial remunerationwhich had been provided’.78
The Diplock Courts
The other key legal arena for lawyers under the emergency law regime in Northern
Irelandwas in the courts themselveswhen defendantswere tried for ‘terrorist related’
74 L. Haijar,Courting Con£ict:The IsraeliMilitary Court System in theWest Bank andGaza (Berkeley CA:
University of California Press, 2005) 174^177.
75 See eg Association for Legal Justice (ALJ), Association for LegalJustice Bulletin (Dublin: ALJ,1971).
76 Interview with Northern Ireland barrister, 3 March 2003.
77 As an editorial in one Dublin-based Nationalist paper outlined: ‘It has been obvious that the Brit-
ish government has attempted to give the Commission hearings an air of legal respectability and
so they do not hesitate to hand out lucrative fees for the prosecution and defence and for the Brit-
ish judges who sit as Commissioners. Northern Irish lawyers should seriously question whether
or not their participation is bringing the profession into disreputeThere are some solicitors who
refuse tobecome involved in these hearings even though it troubles their conscience as towhether
an appearance would be helpful to the accused. There are others who are only too glad to take
whatever cases are going, but these should seriously question whether or not their appearances
lend weight and authority to a procedure which, by substituting form for substance, makes a
sad mockery of the noble concept of justice’ (Irish Press 23 August 1974).
78 K. Boyle,T. Hadden and P.Hillyard, Lawand the State:TheCase ofNorthern Ireland (London:Martin
Robertson,1975) 67.
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o¡ences. Following the introduction of direct rule fromWestminster, the British
government established a review committee chaired by Lord Diplock to consider
‘what arrangements for the administration of justice in Northern Ireland could be
made in order to deal more e¡ectively with terrorist organisations . . . otherwise
than by internment by the Executive’.79 The Report, published in December 1972,
proposed a range of measures designed to facilitate convictions of suspected parami-
litaries including that police and army powers of stop, question and arrest be
extended, limitations on bail be imposed, and that the law governing the admissi-
bility of confessions be relaxed. Finally, a systemwas recommended to suspend jury
trial for a list of ‘Scheduled O¡ences’, the Commission having concluded that jury
trial was impractical for terrorist crimes because of the threat of intimidation of wit-
nesses and the fear that Loyalist defendants would be perversely acquitted by predo-
minately Protestant juries.80 The bulk of the Diplock Commission’s proposals were
subsequently enacted by the British government in the Northern Ireland (Emer-
gency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA).
Section 2(1) of the EPA provided that ‘a trial on indictment of a scheduled
o¡ence shall be conducted by the court without a jury’.This measure underlined
the increased signi¢cance of successfully obtaining confessions from‘terrorist’sus-
pects, with some studies suggesting that up to 80 per cent of all Diplock prosecu-
tions were based primarily upon confessional evidence.81Although Lord Diplock
did not recommend ending internment, the government clearly envisaged that
more suspects would be tried before the courts thereby facilitating its eventual
phasing out ^ as occurred in 1975.82 As Jackson has argued, the cumulative e¡ects
of the new strategy were to facilitate more coercive interrogation techniques.83
While levels of brutality and coercion in confessions at specialist interrogation
centres such as Castlereagh and Gough Barracks appeared to peak in the 1970s
and early 1980s,84 incidents continued even into the early 1990s.85
As with the operation of the internment proceedings, the response of lawyers
in Northern Ireland to the introduction and institutionalisation of the Diplock
courts was to continue participating.There was little organised resistance within
the legal community to the removal of jury trial for paramilitary suspects. It is
di⁄cult to gauge whether or not lawyers were persuaded by the arguments put
79 Lord Diplock, Report of the Commission to Consider Legal Procedures to DealWithTerrorist Activities in
Northern Ireland (London: HMSO,1972) 1.
80 Diplock, ibid paras 17, 35^37. For a critique of this reasoning see S. Greer and A.White, Abolishing
the Diplock Courts:The Case for Restoring JuryTrial to Scheduled O¡ences in Northern Ireland (London:
CobdenTrust,1986).
81 Jackson and Doran, n 2 above, 31.
82 M. Cunningham, British Government Policy in Northern Ireland, 1969^89 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1991) 70.
83 J. Jackson,‘ManyYears on inNorthern Ireland:TheDiplock Legacy’ (2009) 60NILQ 213, 216^17.
84 Amnesty International, Report of an Amnesty International Mission to Northern Ireland (London:
Amnesty International, 1978); P.Taylor, Beating theTerrorists? Interrogation in Omagh, Gough and Cas-
tlereagh (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,1980). K. Boyle,T. Hadden and P. Hillyard,TenYearsOn
in Northern Ireland:The Legal Control of PoliticalViolence (London: CobdenTrust,1980).
85 See eg Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ), Allegations of Ill-Treatment in Castlereagh
(Belfast: CAJ, 1991); Amnesty International, United Kingdom: Allegations of Ill-Treatment in Northern
Ireland (London: Amnesty International,1991); HelsinkiWatch,Children inNorthern Ireland: Abused
by the Security Forces and Paramilitaries (Washington: HelsinkiWatch,1991).
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forward by Lord Diplock’s report concerning jury intimidation and the risk of
perverse acquittals of Loyalist suspects; opinion seemed evenly divided amongst
those interviewed.What is clear is that there was a lack of public debate amongst
key actors and institutions in the legal community about the emergency laws.
I have been unable to unearth any formal submissions from either the Law
Society or the Bar Council to either the Diplock Commission or any of the other
principal commissions and investigations that reported on the operation of the
emergency law system in Northern Ireland in the 1970s and 1980s.Whilst the
Northern Ireland Law Society and BarCouncilwere signi¢cantly smaller and less
well resourced than their counterparts in England andWales, the apparent lack of
engagement is still marked. As John Jackson has pointed out, theymade interven-
tions on issues regarding Legal Aid and legal representation for ‘ordinary’ o¡en-
ders following the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence Order
(Northern Ireland) 1989.86 In the regular reviews of the emergency law provisions
however,87 evidence from both bodies is conspicuously absent.88 Indeed, the Ben-
nett Enquiry which investigated the allegations of police brutality and torture in
the holding centres and questions of lawyer/client access during interrogations
made a pointed note that while it received letters from some individual solicitors
after an organisational invite was sent to the Law Society, they ‘received no infor-
mation from the Bar Council or from individual barristers’.89 Again one must
stress that some individual lawyers did take a public stance in producing critical
commentaries on the operation of the system.90 However, as is discussed further
below, it was more common to see criticisms of the emergency law system being
made by prominent lawyers and lawyers’ organisations from beyond Northern
Ireland.91
86 J. Jackson, M.Wolfe and K. Quinn, Legislating Against Silence:The Northern Ireland Experience (Bel-
fast: Northern Ireland O⁄ce, 2000) and correspondence with the author.
87 See E. Compton,Report of the Enquiry intoAllegations Against the Security Forces of Physical Brutality in
Northern Ireland ArisingOut of Events on 9th August 1971 (London: HMSO,1971); Lord Parker,Report
of a Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Consider theAuthorised Procedures for the Interrogation of
Persons Suspected of Terrorism (London: HMSO, 1972); Diplock, n 79 above; Lord Shackleton,
Reviewof theOperation of the Prevention ofTerrorism (Temporary Provisions)Acts1974 and1976 (London:
HMSO,1978); Earl Jellicoe,Reviewof theOperation of the Prevention ofTerrorism (Temporary Provisions)
Act 1976 (London: HMSO,1983).
88 Lord Gardiner, n 73 above; G. Baker,Reviewof theOperation of theNorthern Ireland (Emergency Provi-
sions) Act 1978 (London, HMSO,1984).
89 J. Bennett, Report of the Committee of Enquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures in Northern Ireland
(London: HMSO, 1979) 3. In his interviews with eleven barristers in Northern Ireland in 1980
Jorgensen argues that any such submission from barristers was viewed as impossible ‘because of
the range of political views inside the bar’. B. Jorgensen,‘Defending theTerrorists: Queen’s Coun-
sel before the Courts of Northern Ireland’ (1982) 9 JLS 115,121.
90 eg P. J. McGrory, Law and the Constitution: Present Discontents: Emergency Legislation (Derry: Field
DayTheatre,1986). McGrory concluded ‘emergency legislation is a product of political instability
and injustice. Its e¡ect has been to intensify both. It has many victims to its discredit; but its ¢rst
victim is the law’ (25). See also E. McDermott,‘Law and Disorder’ in M. Farrell (ed),TwentyYears
On (Dingle: Brandon,1989).
91 See eg R. Harvey,Diplock and theAssault onCivil Liberties:Time toRepeal Northern Ireland’s Emergency
Legislation (London: Haldane Society of Socialist Lawyers, 1981); D. Kor¡,The Diplock Courts in
Northern Ireland: A FairTrial ? (Utrecht: Netherlands Institute of Human Rights, 1983); K. Asmal,
If Law is the Enemy: Human Rights in Northern Ireland: Britain’s Responsibilities (London: Britain &
Ireland Human Rights Project,1990).
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Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the Diplock courts was the period known
as the ‘Supergrass’ era.While there had been sporadic supergrass style trials in the
1970s,92 themass trials of large numbers of paramilitary suspects based on the evidence
of alleged accomplices (whowere either granted immunity or reduced sentences and
given resources to establish‘a new life’ elsewhere) did not become amainstayof secur-
ity strategy until the early1980s. BetweenNovember1981andNovember1983 at least
7 Loyalist and19Republican supergrasseswere responsible for nearly 600 people being
arrested and chargedwith paramilitary-related o¡ences.93While conviction rates were
initially very high,94 by1986 the practice appears to have been largely abandoned.The
reasons for that shift are worth examiningmore closely for current purposes.
Following the initially successful prosecutions in the Bennett, Black andMcGrady
cases, the judiciary increasingly became much more critical of the evidence brought
before them in supergrass trials. In particular, the credibility of some of the chief
prosecutionwitnesses was held up to scrutiny. For example, one Republican super-
grass (Raymond Gilmour) was described by then Lord Chief Justice Lowry as
‘entirely unworthy of belief since he was a completely sel¢sh, self-regarding man,
towhose lips in thewitness box a lie invariablycamemore naturally than the truth.’95
A second and related featurewas the skill and persistence of some defence counsel
in undermining the credibilityof Crownwitnesses, seeking to clarify the nature and
impact of the inducements o¡ered to the supergrasses and questioning the ability of
the judiciary to act as arbiters of both fact and law.As one solicitor who represented a
number of defendants in supergrass trials told the author:
I think that barristers like Dessie Boal can take a great deal of credit in undermining
the supergrass system. People like him just picked and picked relentlessly at evidence
in a reasoned and well argued fashion until the whole thing fell apart . . . of course
they were helped by the fact that in a number of the cases the supergrasses them-
selves were very dubious characters but it was still very e¡ective advocacy.96
A third factor was the growing unrest at the impact of the trials on notions of
judicial independence and the rule of law. Again while that unease was not per-
haps so manifest amongst local practitioners,97 it became increasingly prominent
92 Workers ResearchUnit,RoughJustice: Bulletin No10 (Belfast:Workers ResearchUnit, 1982).
93 See Mr Nicholas Scott, Northern Ireland Junior Minister, HC Debates vol 73, 100, 1985.While
Scott put the ¢gure at 593 for 1982^1985, Greer argues that this is an underestimation as it did
not take account of the number of supergrasses who retracted their evidence before their names
became public. S. Greer, Supergrasses: A Study in Anti-terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland
(Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1995) 57.
94 In the ¢rst three signi¢cant cases, 88 per cent of the 64 defendants in the three trials were found
guilty. See Rv Graham and Others (1983) 7 NIJB; Rv Donnelly (1983) unreported judgement; Rv
Gibney 13 NIJB 2. These cases were popularly known by the names of the supergrasses around
which they were built, ie Bennett, Black and McGrady.
95 Rv Robson and others (unreported) cited in Greer, n 92 above at 136.
96 Interviewwith solicitor, 22 September 2003. Desmond Boal QCwas a formerUnionist member
of the Stormont Parliament and one of the most experienced and highly regarded barristers to
operate in the Diplock system.
97 Although see E. Grant,‘The use of Supergrass Evidence inNorthern Ireland1982^1985’ (1985) 135
NLJ 1125; McGrory, n 90 above and McDermott, n 90 above for useful critiques from senior
practitioners.
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in academic circles98 and amongst practitioners from outside the jurisdiction.99 In
1983 Lord Gi¡ord QC (a Labour peer) was commissioned by the London-based
civil liberties organisation, the Cobden Trust, to conduct an inquiry into the
supergrass system. Gi¡ord’s highly critical report argued that the absence of a jury
in the Diplock process was a key failing of the supergrass system andwas directly
responsible for the corrosion of public con¢dence in the Northern Irish judiciary
and legal system. Gi¡ord’s detailed and legalistic critique was aimed in particular
at ‘mainland’ judges and lawyers and underlined the failures of the Diplock courts
to uphold common law standards of fairness and due process.100 In e¡ect, his strat-
egy appeared designed to embarrass Northern Ireland judges in the eyes of their
British peers. Indeed, his central argument was subsequently, if only implicitly,
endorsed by the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal in e¡ectively dismantling
the system.101
The few critical voices raised against the supergrass system from within the
Northern Ireland legal communitywere to be found amongst groups of specialist
criminal practitioners, left-wing lawyers and a £edgling human rights non-
governmental organisation ^ the Committee on the Administration of Justice
(discussed below). By their own admission, as one seasoned activist recalled, each
of these were ‘small, vocal when we could get our voices heard, but by and large
irrelevant’.102 The specialist criminal practitioners group, the Solicitors Criminal
Bar Association (established in 1982), issued an unheeded call for solicitors to
boycott the supergrass system.103 Another body, the Northern Ireland Association
of Socialist Lawyers (NIASL), established in 1980, called for the repeal of the
emergency laws, organised speaking opportunities for visiting left-wing lawyers
and attempted to coordinate with other community-based organisations
who were involved in the anti-supergrass campaign.104 In reviewing the NIASL
archives and in interviews with a number of former members, it is clear that the
group felt their e¡orts were ‘bedevilled by the general apathy and conservatism
98 eg J. Jackson, ‘The Use of Supergrasses as a Method of Prosecuting in Northern Ireland’ in 10th
Report of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights; Report for 1983^84 (London: HMSO,
1985); S. Greer,‘Supergrasses and the Legal System in Northern Ireland and Great Britain’ (1986)
102 LQR 198. It should be noted that other legal academics were strong supporters of the
supergrass system, see eg E. Graham, ‘AVital Weapon in the Anti-terrorist Arsenal’ (1983) 198
Fortnight 10.
99 eg M. Bonnemarche, Preliminary Report of the ObserverMission Attending the Hearing on Appeal of the
Case of the 22 Irish Nationalists (Brussels: International Association of Democratic Lawyers, 1986).
100 Greer, n 93 above,114.
101 Livingstone also makes the telling point that another reason for the ultimate judicial unease with
supergrass trials was that it was one area of anti-terrorist practices where there was no express
parliamentary approval. See S. Livingstone, ‘And Justice forAll? The Judiciary and the Legal Pro-
fession inTransition’ in C. Harvey (ed), Human Rights, Equality and Democratic Renewal in Northern
Ireland (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 150.
102 Interview 26 November 2009.
103 InterviewNorthern Ireland solicitor, 21March 2003.
104 NIASL, Manifesto and Constitution (Belfast: NIASL, 1980); NIASL, Civil Liberties and Socialism in
Northern Ireland (Belfast: NIASL, 1981); NIASL, Annual Review and Annual Report 1981/82 and
1982/3 (Belfast: NIASL, 1982, 1983).The 1982 Annual Report of the organisation notes that there
was a total membership of 25. An undated press release fromNIASL issued in autumn1983which
notes an address by Lord Gi¡ord also records the organization’s e¡orts to assist in better mobilis-
ing the anti-supergrass campaign.
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of the legal community’ and, like its predecessor the Northern Ireland Society
of Labour Lawyers, it too went out of existence after a few years of frustrated
activism.105
Other lawyers chose to put their critical energies into the nascent human rights
NGO, the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ). The CAJ held its
¢rst conferences in 1981and 1982 on various aspects of emergency laws, including
the supergrass system.106 The CAJ still campaigns vigorously on human rights
and has grown to become a highly respected human rights organisation.107
However, committed members acknowledge that its in£uence was also probably
fairly marginal up until the late 1980s.108 While CAJ has always included some
practising lawyers, and it has taken prominent legal action, much of its leadership
and most active membership has traditionally come from the academic and com-
munity sectors.
Other than these critical voices, the contribution of the local legal community
to the demise of the supergrass systemwas largely con¢ned to the courts. As with
the operation of internment, and the running of the Diplock system more gen-
erally, many lawyers appear to have simply got onwith their legal practices rather
than questioning the operation of these emergency laws. Of course, internment
hearings or Diplock trials were arguably only ‘core business’ for a comparatively
small number of specialist criminal lawyers and perhaps 6^8 solicitor ¢rms.109
The marginalisation of criminal work amongst legal practitioners is not unique
to Northern Ireland110 and does not fully explain a tendency for the bulk of
lawyers in the jurisdiction to acquiescence so readily to self-evidently controver-
sial legal measures. In other legal cultures, lawyers tend to coalesce and organise
within the legal community into, for example, black lawyers’ or feminist lawyers’
collectives, in order to pressurise more conservative parent bodies into taking
a stand.111 This did not occur in Northern Ireland. The creation of a Catholic
or Nationalist sub-grouping within the profession was viewed as sectarian.
However, the absence of such a grouping or at least an alternative source of
meaningful pressure encouraged a de facto acquiescence with the status quo.
The view was repeatedly expressed in the ¢eldwork that taking ‘a political stance’
on issues such as emergency law would create sectarian division in the legal
community.Whether the concerns to avoid a divided profession were justi¢ed is
105 Interview with Northern Ireland Solicitor, 27 May 2002. See also N. Shannon, Problem for the
Socialist Lawyer and the Northern Ireland Association of Socialist Lawyers 1 January 1983, paper made
available to the author.
106 CAJ,The Administration of Justice in Northern Ireland: Proceedings of a Conference (Belfast: CAJ, 1981);
CAJ, Emergency Laws in Northern Ireland: Conference Report (Belfast: CAJ,1982).
107 In 1998 CAJ was awarded the Council of Europe Human Rights Prize for its contribution to the
peace process in Northern Ireland. By way of a declaration of interest, the author is a former
Chairperson and Executive Committee member of CAJ.
108 Interview with long term CAJ activist, 26 November 2009.
109 Jackson and Doran, n 2 above at 83. See also J. Morison and P. Leith,The Barrister’sWorld and the
Nature of Law (Milton Keynes: OpenUniversity Press, 1992) 40.
110 See egM.McConville, J. Hodgson, L. Bridges and A. Pavlovic, Standing Accused:TheOrganisation
and Practices of Criminal Defence Lawyers in Britain (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1994).
111 J. Smith,‘The Black BarAssociation and Civil Rights’ (1981^82) 15 Creighton LR 651; E. Sheehy
and S. MacIntyre, Calling for Change:Women, Law and the Legal Profession (Ottawa: University of
Ottawa Press, 2006).
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discussed further below.The net result, however, was that without such pressures
fromwithin the legal profession, for much of the con£ict, bodies such as the Law
Society and Bar Council said little or nothing about very signi¢cant events in the
justice system. Not ‘speaking out’ in such circumstances is in fact a very meaning-
ful act of language,112 an inherently active rather than a passive response.113 In this
context, the relative silence of lawyers about emergency law related human rights
abuses arguably constituted what Cohen has described as ‘a blameworthy form of
collusion or encouragement’.114 It was also quintessentially political.
THE EMERGENCEOFACOLLECTIVE LEGALCONSCIENCE?
The critical junctures discussed above show how the Northern Ireland legal profes-
sion (failed to) responded to broader political events and dramatic changes to the
criminal justice system.This section analyses how lawyers responded to eventswithin
the legal community when the con£ict and beginnings of the peace process
impacted directly upon the version of professionalism propagated by the legal pro-
fession in Northern Ireland. In particular, I explore the ways in which the Law
Society and Bar Council, as perhaps the most powerful organised voices within the
legal community, responded to a number of important challenges. As one intervie-
wee for this research commented,‘in the idealworld, a Law Societyor a Bar Council
should function as the collective conscience of the legal profession’.115 The term col-
lective conscience,while it has obviousDurkheimian resonances, is used here to por-
tray the e¡orts by legal collectives to display what Halliday has described as ‘moral
authority’, where legal knowledge and skills are deployed in a self-consciouslymoral
fashion because it is deemed ‘the right thing to do.’116
The Murders of Patrick Finucane and Rosemary Nelson
I have written elsewhere about the complex narratives surrounding the murders
of Pat Finucane and Rosemary Nelson.117 For this paper, it is only necessary to
provide su⁄cient detail to understand the broader processes of legal and political
mobilisationwhich have surrounded the two events.
Patrick Finucane’s murder, in 1989, is one of the most controversial killings of
the Northern Ireland con£ict. Although, as was noted above, other judges and
legal ¢gures were killed by paramilitaries, it is the persistent allegations of state
collusion in Finucane’s death that led to it becoming such a high pro¢le death.118
112 L.Wittgenstein,Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge, 2001) 7.
113 J.Winter ‘Thinking About Silence’ in E. Ben-Ze’ev, R. Gionio and J.Winter (eds), Shadows ofWar:
A Social History of Silence in theTwentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
11.
114 S. Cohen, States of Denial: Knowing About Atrocities and Su¡ering (Cambridge: Polity, 2001).
115 InterviewNorthern Ireland barrister, 25 August 2005.
116 T. Halliday,‘Knowledge Mandates: Collective In£uence by Scienti¢c, Normative and Syncretic
Professions’ (1985) 36 BritishJournal of Sociology 421, 429.
117 McEvoy and ReboucheŁ , n 22 above.
118 J. O’Brien, Killing Finucane:Murder in Defence of the Realm (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2005).
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Finucane was a defence solicitor whose clients included several leading Republi-
cans.The LoyalistUlster DefenceAssociation, who shot him, claimed that he was
amember of the IRA.While a number of his brotherswere IRAmembers, inves-
tigations by the RUC, former Metropolitan Police Commissioner now Lord
Stevens and former Canadian Supreme Court Justice Peter Cory all concluded
that he was not a member of any Republican paramilitary grouping.119 Prior to
Finucane’s death he and a number of other defence lawyers had expressed con-
cerns regarding direct death threats frompolice o⁄cers andwarnings from clients
that the policewere also urging Loyalists to kill certain solicitors who represented
Republicans.120 In addition, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Douglas
Hogg MP told the House of Commons a few weeks before Finucane was
murdered that ‘there are in Northern Ireland a number of solicitors who are
unduly sympathetic to the cause of the IRA’.121 In the third of his inquiries into
this case and surrounding allegations of collusion, former Metropolitan Chief
Constable Sir John Stevens concluded that the Minister’s comments were based
on information provided by the RUC,‘were not justi¢able and that the Minister
was compromised’.122 Both the Stevens Inquiries and the Cory Report found
evidence of collusion between the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries in
Finucane’s death.123
Allegations of state collusion in the murder of Pat Finucane emerged almost
immediately after the killing. However, the reaction of the local legal community
to the murder of a fellow lawyer itself became a source of considerable contro-
versy.The BarCouncil, appeared to take the view that since the threatswere direc-
ted against solicitors rather than barristers, it was beyond their purview and did
not comment on the killing.124 The Law Society issued a statement condemning
the murder and held a public meeting. However, no further o⁄cial action was
taken other than to make private representations to the authorities.125 Despite
the fact that the Law Society was aware of the nature of the threats being made
against lawyers by the RUC and the comments byMr Hogg which preceded the
Finucane murder, the Society failed to call for an inquiry into the circumstances
of his death or to call for measures designed to protect the independence of law-
yers. In his ¢nding that harassment of lawyers by theRUC had occurred, theUN
119 See J. Stevens, Stevens Enquiry 3: Overview and Recommendations (2003) 11 at http://www.madden-
¢nucane.com/pat¢nucane/archive/pat_¢nucane/2003-04-17_stevens_report.pdf (last visited 28 Jan-
uary 2011); P. Cory,Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Patrick Finucane (London: HMSO, 2004) 11.
120 Amnesty International,United Kingdom: HumanRights Concerns (London: Amnesty International,
1991) 56; BIRW, Intimidation of Defence Lawyers in Northern Ireland Update (London: BIRW, 1992);
LCHR, Human Rights and Legal Defence in Northern Ireland (New York: LCHR, 1993); LCHR,
Beyond Collusion:The UKSecurity Forces and theMurder of Pat Finucane (NewYork, LCHR, 2003).
121 Hansard, House of Commons, Standing Committee B 17 January 1989 col 508.
122 Stevens, n 117 above.
123 An army agent supplied the intelligence which led to Mr Finucane’s death and an RUC Special
Branch agent supplied the principalweapon used and both claimed to have told the authorities of
the planned assassination. Another RUC informer, Ken Barrett, pleaded guilty and was con-
victed of the actual murder in 2004.When these events were being investigated by Lord Stevens,
his report referred to ‘a deliberate act of arson when his Incident room was destroyed by ¢re’ and ‘widespread
obstruction’ of his enquiry by the RUC and Army. Stevens, n 119 above; Cory, n 119 above.
124 Livingstone, n 101 above,137.
125 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, n 120 above, 61.
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Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Lawyers and Judges concluded that
the Law Society had potentially breached its professional duties under Principle
25 of theUnited Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers which requires
professional associations to work to ensure that lawyers are able to do their job
‘without improper interference’.
The Special Rapporteur expresses his concern over themanner inwhich the profes-
sional bodies in Northern Ireland, particularly the Law Society, addressed this issue.
Harassment and intimidation of defence lawyers goes to the core of the concept of
independence of the legal profession and the administration of justice.The profes-
sional associations in such cases are duty bound to rush to the aid of their members
in such situations.What greater objective or interest can the organized legal profes-
sion have than the protection of the independence of the profession and it of its
individual members.126
One prominent criminal practitioner, BarraMcGrory, himself the object of death
threats, lodged an unsuccessful judicial review challenge to a decision by the Law
Society President which prevented the Law Society’s human rights committee
from even discussing a report by a London-based human rights group into collu-
sion by the security forces in the killing.127 The Law Society’s position in main-
taining its continued opposition to calling for a public inquiry was that ‘there was
an overtly political dimension to all of this . . . and we wanted to be absolutely
neutral’.128
The Finucane killing became something of a cause ceŁ le' bre in the international
legal community. Indeed, the campaign for a full public inquiry into the case
headed by Mr Finucane’s widow and a number of his former legal colleagues
deliberately chose to focus on international legal actors because of what they per-
ceived as the obduracy and conservatism of the local Law Society. As one lawyer
involved in the campaign told the author,
The week after Pat was killed I was told in Castlereagh [holding centre] ‘that bas-
tard’s been shot and you are next’ and all this sort of stu¡.We started to record it and I
sent a letter to the Law Society asking them to take it up. . . I got a letter back saying
this isn’t amatter for the Law Society, take it upwithyour political representative . . .
So I didn’t really expect the Law Society as a body to do anything, although others
were incensed but I had no expectations . . . they were really the last bastion if you
like, after all the numerous other law societies and lawyers throughout the world
who signed up calling for an inquiry, they were the last to support it.129
126 C. Paramwswamy,Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence ofJudges and Lawyers, Report of a
Mission to theUnited Kingdom (NewYork: United Nations Economic and Social Council,1998) 12.
127 ‘Law Body Blocking Report on Finucane’ Irish News 10 March 1999; ‘NI Law Society O⁄cers
‘‘Trying to Stop’’ Study of Murder Report’ IrishTimes 10 March 1999.The report in question was
British Irish RightsWatch, Justice Delayed: Alleged State Collusion InThe Murder Of Patrick Finucane
And Others (London: British Irish RightsWatch,1999).
128 Interview with Law Society representative,13 December 2002.
129 Interview with solicitor, 21 February 2003. The range of international voices which eventually
joined such calls included Claire Palley (UK nominee to the UN Sub-Commission on the Pre-
vention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities); Peter Burns (UK Rapporteur for
the UNCommittee AgainstTorture); the UN Special Representative on Human Rights Defen-
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The attention of prominent international actors was not always welcomed by the
local legal establishment. One renowned American lawyer found the Northern
Ireland local Law Society ‘actively hostile’to the involvement of international law-
yers in lobbying for a public inquiry.130 These international critics were also
joined by a range of British-based and local organisations including Liberty, the
Haldane Society, the Northern Ireland Standing Advisory Commission on
Human Rights (SACHR), CAJ and British Irish RightsWatch.131
In the context of the gathering international momentum on the case, a group
of 33 lawyers fromNorthern Ireland issued a statement calling for an inquiry into
the allegations of collusion in the Finucanemurder in January1998.132 The follow-
ing year the Bar Council of Northern Ireland indicated that it too was now sup-
porting the call by the UN Special Rapporteur for an independent judicial
inquiry into the killing, thus con¢rming the isolation of the Law Society.133
The debate was given added impetus by the murder of a second lawyer,
RosemaryNelson, againwith strong claims of collusion emerging almost imme-
diately after the killing.134 Mrs Nelsonwas one of the lawyers who had called for
an inquiry into the Finucane killing. She too had acted in a number of high pro-
¢le cases, defending an alleged commander of the IRA and representing a
Nationalist residents’ group in Portadown that was actively campaigning against
Orange marches through their neighbourhood. She also began to receive similar
threats to those which had preceded the Finucane murder and these were well
documented by a range of important human rights actors.135 Part of the strategy
adopted by Nelson and the human rights activists withwhom she was in contact
was to raise her international pro¢le in order to o¡er her greater protection. A
number of local and international human rights groups wrote to the RUC and
the Northern Ireland O⁄ce expressing concerns for her safety. She also gave evi-
dence to amuch publicised American Congressional Committee hearing in Sep-
tember 1998 where, in addition to detailing the threats and intimidation against
lawyers, she testi¢ed about her fears for her own safety. InMarch1999, those fears
were realised when she was murdered by Loyalist paramilitaries.136
ders; HelsinkiWatch (later renamed Human RightsWatch); Amnesty International; the Interna-
tional Federation of Human Rights; the International Commission of Jurists; the International
BarAssociation; the American BarAssociation and the NewYork BarAssociation.
130 Interview with Mike Posner, Executive Director Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (now
called Human Rights First) 14 June 2002. Mr Posner, who is nowAssistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights in the Obama administration, waived his o¡er of anonymity for this research.
131 G. FinucaneThe Long Road toTruth: PJMcGroryMemorial Lecture (Belfast: Feile An Phobail, 2004).
132 Statement issued by 33 lawyers on 14 January 1998,‘Equal ProtectionUnder the Law’ reproduced
in Amnesty International, Report on Intimidation of Defence Lawyers in Northern Ireland (London:
Amnesty International,1998).
133 ‘Finucane Inquiry Backed By Bar Council’ Irish News 19 February 1999.
134 At the time of writing, a public inquiry into these allegations of collusion in the murder of Mrs
Nelson is ongoing. SeeM.Mooreland, Chairman’s Initiation Statement, Rosemary Nelson Pub-
lic Inquiry, 19 April 2005 at http://www.rosemarynelsoninquiry.org/current-key-documents/
(last visited 28 January 2011).
135 For example, in his 1998 report the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers paid special attention to these death threats and, repeated in a range of press interviews
that Mrs Nelson’s life could be in particular danger.
136 P. Cory, Collusion Inquiry Rosemary Nelson (London: HMSO, 2004).
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The reaction of the legal community to this murder, which took place ¢ve
years after the ¢rst cease-¢re declarations, was much less ambivalent than it had
been to Finucane’s. Strong public condemnations were issued by the Law Society,
Bar Council and Lord Chief Justice.137 This second murder also appeared to gal-
vanise those who had been seeking to change the position of the Law Society
with regard to the Finucane killing. In May 1999 a group of twenty petitioners
forced an Extraordinary General Meeting of the Law Society which called for an
independent inquiry into both the killings of Finucane andNelson and amotion
of no-con¢dence in the Society’s Ruling Council. The resultant meeting, was
attended by over 700 of the 1,700 solicitors then in the jurisdiction. The motion
for an independent inquiry into the Finucane killing was overwhelmingly car-
ried, the motion with regard to Nelson was also supported albeit by a narrow
majority138 and the vote of no-con¢dence was defeated.139 While some promi-
nent Unionist lawyers criticised what they perceived as a political ‘take over’ of
the Law Society,140 most of those who took part in the debate, including those
who supported the losing position of the Law Society Council, commented on
the largely professional and serious nature of the discussion.141
As the spokesperson for the Law Society interviewed for this research
acknowledged, the much feared split into sectarian camps by the Society’s move
away from‘neutrality’ did notmaterialise.142 Indeed, manyof thosewho took part
in the debatewere at pains to stress to the author how the voting, particularlywith
regard to the Finucane case, did not divide into a simple sectarian head-count
between Catholics and Protestants.While the religious demographics in the pro-
fession had changed over the course of the con£ict with an increase in the number
of Catholics,143 only one of those interviewed suggested this was the key variable
in the changed position.144 Certainly those who proposed the motion appeared to
have given signi¢cant tactical thought to how the arguments should be presented.
A number of speakers who spoke in favour of an independent inquiry self-iden-
ti¢ed as being from a Unionist background and many made reference to the
137 ‘Law Body in Call forTalks with Flanagan’ Irish News 17 March 1999.
138 Many of those present argued that given the investigation into Mrs Nelson’s murder had only
been ongoing for two months, the call for an independent public inquiry was premature. Inter-
view with solicitor, 28 June 2008.
139 ‘Law Society U-turn over Nelson Death’ Irish News 12 May 1999.
140 MsArlene Foster, now a DemocraticUnionist PartyMinister in the Northern Ireland Executive,
quoted in‘Unionists Hit Out as Law Society Backs Probe; Solicitors DemandMurder Inquiries’
BelfastTelegraph 12 May 1999.
141 CatherineDixon, President of the LawSociety, quoted in‘NI SolicitorsOverturnCouncil’s Deci-
sion on Finucane Inquiry’ IrishTimes 12 May 1999.
142 Interview with Law Society representative,13 December 2002.
143 In the 1971Census (inwhich 15.6 per cent of lawyers did not give their religion) 27.9 per cent self-
declared as Catholic, with the remaining 56.5 were Protestant. In the 1981 (in which 19.7 per cent
did not give their religion) the percentage of Catholic lawyers had risen to 37.8. Figures repro-
duced in D. Greer, ‘Access to Legal Education and the Legal Profession in Northern Ireland’ in
R. Dhavan, N. Kibble andW.Twining (eds), Access to Legal Education and the Legal Profession (Lon-
don: Butterworths, 1989) 214. Morison and Fox note that since 1979^80 a majority of students
enrolling in the Law School at Queen’sUniversity Belfast (which then produced the vast number
of local practitioners) have been Catholic. See J. Morison and M. Fox, ‘Lawyers in a Divided
Society: Legal Culture and Legal Services in Northern Ireland’ (1992) 19 JLS 124,139.
144 Interview with solicitor, 25 November 2002.
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international commentaryon the case.145 The fact that somany international legal
commentators had explicitly framed the issue of the protection of lawyers as a
human rights issue and drawn upon the relevant international standards gave law-
yers a familiar legal language through which to manage a potentially divisive
topic.146 This same human rights languagewas to prove equally crucial in the ¢nal
critical juncture examined in this paper, the judicial challenge to the Declaration
required in order to become a Queen’s Counsel.
Legal challenges to ‘well and truly serve the Queen’
If the debates concerning the calls for a public inquiry into the deaths of Finucane
and Nelsonwere the de¢ningmoments of the early stage of the peace process for
solicitors in Northern Ireland, without doubt the equivalent for the Bar was the
challenge taken by two senior barristers concerning the Declaration required to
become a Queen’s Counsel.
Almost since the formation of the state, any barrister seeking promotion to
Queen’s Counselwas required to take anOath of Allegiance to the Crown as well
as a particular Declaration of O⁄ce.147 While no similarly worded oath was
required in England, as was noted above, the emphasis upon‘loyalty’ in Northern
Ireland was in keeping with many other aspects of public life in the Unionist-
dominated state of the Stormont era.148 Following the imposition of direct rule
in 1972, the power to appoint QCs passed to the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland, acting on the advice of the Lord Chief Justice. In 1995, barrister Philip
Mageemade an application for judicial reviewchallenging both theOath of Alle-
giance and the Declaration of O⁄ce. Before that case was heard, however, it was
conceded that the Oath of Allegiance was contrary to the Promissory Oaths Act
1868 and it was abandoned but the Declaration remained. In subsequent corre-
spondence with the Secretary of State, the then Lord Chief Justice of Northern
Ireland, Sir Brian Hutton, cautioned against removing the Declaration.
If you decide to remove the requirement for a declaration it will appear that you are
either being in£uenced by political pressure to alter the procedure relating to an o⁄ce
which links Northern Ireland to the Crown or you will appear to be accepting
the allegation of MrMagee. . .149
145 Interview with solicitor,14 February 2002, Interview with solicitor, 28 June 2008.
146 Interview with solicitor, 21 February 2003.
147 The declaration of o⁄ce was required in the following terms: ‘I do declare that well and truly I
will serve the Queen as one of Her Counsel learned in the law and truly counsel the Queen in
Her matters, when I shall be called upon to do so, and duly and truly administer the Queen’s
process after the course of the law, and after my cunning. I will duly in convenient time speed
suchmatters as I may lawfully dowhich any person shall have to do in the law against the Queen.
And in all other respects I will be attendant to the Queen’s matters when I be thereto’. Cited inRe
Treacy’s and another’s Application forJudicial Review [2000] NILR 334 (ReTreacy).
148 McEvoy andWhite, n 35 above.
149 ReTreacy n 147 above, 334.
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A Bar Council committee, under the chairmanship of Fraser Elliot QC, con-
cluded that the Declaration to the Crownwas outdated and irrelevant and that ‘a
neutral Declaration’ which obliged QCs to serve ‘all whom [they] may lawfully
be called upon to serve’would be more appropriate.150 The Bar Council accepted
this report, forwarding it to the Lord Chief Justice, by then Sir Robert Carswell.
In subsequent correspondence to the Lord Chancellor regarding the Elliott
report,151 the Lord Chief Justice made clear his view that the Declaration ought
to be maintained. Agreeing with the views of his predecessor, Lord Chief Justice
Carswell wrote,
I think it is likely that if there is no longer a requirement that those who become
Queen’s Counsel make a Declaration to serve the Queen it could be argued that
there is no longer any reason why they should be called Queen’s Counsel. I have
little doubt myself that this is all part of an ongoing politically-based campaign to
have the o⁄ce of Queen’s Counsel replaced by a rank entitled Senior Counsel, or
something to that e¡ect.
The Lord Chancellor ultimately decided to side with the Lord Chief Justice and
to retain the Declaration. In December 1999, when Seamus Treacy (now a high
court judge) and Barry McDonald were called to become QCs they indicated
their desire to make the Declaration in the terms outlined in the Elliott report.
The Bar Council supported them on this issue. Eventually the two barristers
sought leave to apply for judicial review and in a highly signi¢cant move, the
Bar Council agreed to support and fund that review. After a group of 30members
challenged the support of the judicial review, the Bar Council convened a special
meeting to discuss the issue as an organisation. Despite media predictions that the
funding would be withdrawn for fear of division, the decision was overwhel-
mingly con¢rmed.152 Indeed, the Bar Council voted to fund the judicial review
after what then Bar Chairperson Brian Fee described as ‘a calm and considered
discussion of the motion’.153 Upon granting leave to appeal, Mr Justice Kerr also
gave leave for both the Bar Council and the Northern Ireland Human Rights
Commission to make oral and written statements. Mr Justice Kerr ultimately
rejected the human rights arguments presented, including that the Declaration
was discriminatory on the grounds of political opinion. He did, however, decide
in favour of the applicants on the narrow grounds that in opting to retain the
Declaration, the Lord Chancellor had been wrong on the facts (with regard to
the consultation of the judges) and this constituted unreasonableness since he
had not foreseen the potential for controversy.154 One month later, the Northern
Ireland Court Service issued a press notice that the Declarationwas to be changed
150 F. Elliot,Report toConsiderAllAspects of theAppointment ofQueen’sCounsel inNorthern Ireland (Belfast:
Bar Council, 1997).
151 RonaldWeatherup QC, quoted in‘Barrister RowRevelation’ IrishNews 5 May 2000.
152 ‘Unionist Barristers Seek to Prevent Bar Council from Paying Catholic Barristers Legal Bill’Sun-
dayTribune 30 January 2000.
153 Quoted in‘Bar Council Funds Barristers Case’ Irish News 1February 2000.
154 ReTreacy n 147 above.
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in line with the Elliott Report. Subsequently, bothTreacy and McDonald were
admitted as QCs.155
In comparison to the ethical decisions onwhether or not to take part in intern-
ment hearings or supergrass trials, or to take aposition on the alleged involvement
of the state in the murder of lawyers, this case on the internal oaths within the
legal profession may appear somewhat trivial. I would argue, however, that from
a political and symbolic perspective, it too represented an important moment.
Since the formation of the state, the courts in Northern Ireland have £own the
Union £ag, displayed Crown insignia and operated in e¡ect as if such traditional
symbolic a⁄liations with British and Unionist language and iconography were
little other than ‘neutral’ expressions of the constitutional status quo. Many
Nationalists had, albeit quietly in the case of the legal profession, long questioned
that assumed neutrality.156 Although these symbols became the subject of the post
Good Friday Agreement Criminal Justice Review (discussed below), this case
together with that taken by Magee represented an explicit challenge by lawyers
rather than politicians to such assumed neutrality.
At a sociological level, it is hard to overstate the sensitivity of these proceedings
within the legal community of such a small jurisdiction. Many of the lawyers
interviewed for this research spoke about what they perceived as the deferential
attitude to judiciary and senior legal ¢gures in general in the local legal commu-
nity.Yet this was a case taken by two prominent barristers, supported by the Bar
Council, against the Lord Chancellor, which focused upon the correspondence of
the previous and serving Lord Chief Justice who had set their face against change.
The traditional arguments that the case would undermine the neutrality of the
Bar did not persuade the large numbers of barristers who attended the special
meeting to discuss the continued support of the challenge.While a small number
of those barristers interviewed for this project were critical of the challenge to the
Declaration as being ‘politically motivated’,157 the vast majority remained suppor-
tive. As one seasoned barrister suggested:
It was one of the Bar’s ¢nest hours in my view.The opposition to it [supporting the
judicial review] was very slender due largely to [name omitted] who spoke a lot of
sense, analysed the thing, showed that this was one of the thingswe ought to do. . . .
Imean therewas no politics in it, therewas no sectarianism.They took the view that
155 The new Declaration stated ‘I [name] do sincerely promise and declare that I will well and truly
serve all whom Imay lawfully be called upon to serve in the o⁄ce of one of HerMajesty’s Coun-
sel learned in the law according to the best of my skill and understanding’ (Northern Ireland
Court Service Press Notice Friday 23 June 2000, Queen’s Counsel Ceremony Declaration is Changed:
Bar-Council’s Recommendation is to beAdopted).
156 As Philip Magee, instigator of the original challenge in 1997, summed up in a strongly worded
statement in 2000 in support of theTreacy/McDonald review. He suggested that the Declaration
was ‘in truth, the genteel equivalent of putting a picture of the Queen on a Catholic worker’s
machine . . . .The Declaration is seen by many barristers as being simply a political test of loyalty
to embarrass and, if possible, to weed out the croppie with attitude.’Quoted in ‘LawyersWait on
Oath of Allegiance Ruling’ (2000) IrishNews, 20 December.The term‘croppy’ is said to be a nick-
name given to the rebels during the 1798 rebellion because of their close-cropped hair. Subse-
quently, the term became synonymous with‘rebel’, Nationalist or Catholic.
157 eg. Interview with barrister, 15 November 2002.
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a number of people had a very genuine deep seated objection to something that
wasn’t right and they supported them.158
In a similar fashion to the EGMheld by the Law Society with regard to theNelson
and Finucane cases, the Bar’s deliberations and ultimate decision to support the legal
challenge against the Declaration showed that it was capable of mature and rational
debate concerning apoliticallydelicate topicwithout adopting the default option of
‘not taking a position’.These developments arguably represent a signi¢cant demon-
stration of a collective legal conscience beingmobilised in support of colleagues on
a matter of principle.While the human rights arguments of theTreacy/McDonald
review were rejected by the court, the fact that the issues concerned could be dis-
cussed by lawyersmore generally in legal terms assisted signi¢cantly. Some scholars
(including the author) have argued that one of theweaknesses of human rights talk
in public discourse more generally is its tendency to deny the quintessentially poli-
tical nature of its argumentation or to obscure the fact that rights claims may con-
£ict.159 However in this context, where lawyers were debating sensitive issues in a
divided society, the fact that discussion could be framed in largely apolitical and
legalistic human rights language was a distinct advantage.
CONCLUSION
‘What did you expect, they are lawyers for God’s Sake!’160
E.P. Thompson famously re£ected on the ‘enormous condescension of poster-
ity’,161 the tendency to judge harshly those facing di⁄cult predicaments from the
comfort of an easier age.This danger is something I have re£ected upon a lot in
the writing of this paper. The obvious retort to the challenges raised here is that
lawyers ‘did their jobs’ in very di⁄cult circumstances and that public stances were
beyond their remit. In considering what ‘their jobs’ were, as the comment above
suggests, a key question is what exactly are our expectations from lawyers in con-
£icted societies. Is doing a competent job in the courtroom or solicitor’s o⁄ce
enough? Should we view lawyers simply as apolitical business people who make
necessary accommodations in order to sustain their own status, income and
monopoly in the marketplace?162 Alternatively, is it fair to burden them
with more pressing responsibilities? Are they the key players in defence of what
Halliday et al de¢ne as ‘political liberalism’ or what Abel terms ‘legality’ in the
post 9/11context?163 Evenmore onerously, shouldwe expect to see the emergence
158 Interview with barrister,14 November 2002.
159 M. Ignatie¡,HumanRights, Politics and Idolatry (PrincetonNJ: PrincetonUniversity Press, 2001) 20;
D. Kennedy,‘The International Human Rights Movement: Part of the Problem?’ (2002) 15Har-
vard Human RightsJournal 116; K. McEvoy, n 6 above.
160 Interview with barrister,15 December 2009.
161 E. P.Thompson,TheMaking of the EnglishWorking Class (London:Victor Gollanz,1963) 18.
162 As Abel described,‘. . . most lawyers just want to earn a living and leave politics to others . . . Like
Rhett Butler, most lawyers frankly do not give a damn.’ R. Abel, n 1 above 470.
163 Halliday, Karpik and Feeley, n 17 above; R. Abel, ‘Contested Legality in the United States after
September 11’ inT. Halliday, L. Karpik and M.Feeley (eds), Fighting for Political Freedom (Oxford:
Hart Publishing, 2007).
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of versions of Scheingold and Sarat’s ‘cause lawyers’ who eschew the myth of
professional neutrality to take a public stand as well as ¢ghting in legal arenas
for what is right and just, however de¢ned?Whatever amalgamof theseWeberian
ideal-types one favours, the reality of how lawyers behave is inevitably shaped by
the social and political conditions of a given society in general and its legal culture
in particular. As Nelken has argued, analysing legal culture o¡ers the potential to
move beyond the quest for universal truths about law and instead garner a more
nuanced view of the ways in which law is ‘conceived and lived’ in di¡erent socie-
ties.164 Amore granular understanding of such lived realities of lawand lawyering
is required in order to assess the extent towhich any such experiences are relevant
for other contexts.
While the precise meaning and analytical utility of the notion of legal culture
is contested,165 the concept is a useful one for current purposes. Friedman’s exten-
siveworkon the topic suggests that legal culture speaks to‘the underlying traits of
awhole legal system - its ruling ideas, its £avour, its style’.166 Certain legal cultures
may be more or less receptive to innovation, styles of reasoning, passive or
dynamic notions of the law and, of course, notions of what professionalism
amongst lawyers actually means. In addition, ‘real forces, real people are at
work.’167 Powerful individuals can have a huge impact on large and diverse policy
communities. In smaller places or organisations, the historical in£uence of, for
example, very conservative Lord Chief Justices or heads of legal collectives
may be in£uential in propagating what Klare referred to as the ‘inarticulate
premises which are culturally and historically ingrained.’168 Thus, the way that
lawyers think, their language, their self-image and status as professionals, their parti-
cular organisational history, their relationship with the state and local politics more
generally - these and other features are the key components of what makes up a
legal culture.
I would argue that it is possible to identify a number of overlapping features of
Northern Ireland’s legal culture that explain, at least in part, why lawyers behaved
as they did. One obvious factor is the nature of the legal community practising in
such a small jurisdiction.The traditional preponderance of sole practitioners and
small ¢rms of solicitors in Northern Ireland did not practically or culturally lend
itself easily to collective organisation beyond obvious pecuniary interests of
members.With regards to the Bar, and perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively, it
appears that the fact that they were and are organised into one Bar Library rather
than di¡erent chambers had a similar e¡ect.The progressive e¡orts by the various
groups discussed above did not take root within the organisational cultures of the
164 D.Nelken,‘Using theConcept of Legal Culture’ (2004) 29AustralianJournal of thePhilosophyof Law
1, 3.
165 R. Cotterell,‘The Concept of Legal Culture’ in D. Nelken (ed), Comparing Legal Cultures (Alder-
shot: Dartmouth,1997).
166 L. Friedman, The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective (New York: Russell Sage, 1975) 15;
L. Friedman, ‘Is there a Modern Legal Culture?’ (1994) 7 Ratio Juris 117; L. Friedman, ‘Human
Rights andModern Legal Culture’ in E. Ryden and B. K. Bundy (eds),HumanRights in the Paci¢c
Rim: Imagining a NewCritical Discourse (Taiwan: Fu Jen Catholic University Press, 2006).
167 Friedman (1975) ibid 155.
168 K. Klare, ‘Legal Culture and Transformative Constitutionalism’ (1998) 4 South African Journal on
Human Rights 146.
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larger legal collectives and, as elsewhere, the concerns of criminal practitioners in
particular could be marginalised. As for the size of the jurisdiction, there is a rich
literature on the impact and importance of ‘small places’ in general and in parti-
cular with regards to the insights which such sites may provide into better under-
standing justice related mores, values and practices.169 As with other knowledge
or professional communities, even in much larger countries, the legal profession
can in reality consist of a comparatively small series of concentric circles
where ‘everyone knows everyone’ by virtue of the nature of the work, status,
reputation, and formal and informal social networks. For much of its history,
almost everyone in the legal profession in Northern Ireland really did know
everyone else.The smallness of the jurisdiction undoubtedly contributed signi¢-
cantly towhat many interviewees identi¢ed as the conservatism of the local legal
culture. Part of that conservatismwas also undoubtedly gendered.The absence of
women on the bench or their ‘ghettoisation’ into certain areas such as family law
were regularly cited as evidence of an ‘old boys’ network’ by interviewees170 and
has been well discussed elsewhere.171 More broadly, however, in such a context
hegemonic and conservative understandings of the appropriate public role for
lawyers were readily reproduced and defended. As one barrister summed it up:
I think lawyers here are instinctively conservative and I don’t think that is a criti-
cism, I think in many ways that conservatism has a very valued place in any social
organism and that is the way it is.172
A second and related feature has been the material and ideological realities of the
war. This was a brutal and violent con£ict which lasted for almost 30 years and
which sawover 3,600 people killed and thousands more injured. Judges and some
lawyers were targeted for doing their job. At the symbolic level, given that the
origins of the con£ict lay in competing claims to British and Irish
political identity, the much discussed centrality of the lawyers’ relationship to the
state (i.e. in the sociology of the legal profession literature) was all the more
acutely felt in Northern Ireland. Emergency laws, internment, harsh interroga-
tion techniques, supergrass trials, collusion: these and other strategies were all
elements of the state’s response to political violence. The British state was
not therefore neutral in the con£ict, it was a protagonist and the justice system
169 SeeT. Eriksen,Small Places:An Introduction toSocial andCulturalAnthropology (London: Pluto, 2001);
F. Adler, Nations Not Obsessed with Crime (Littleton CO: F.B. Rothman, 1983); H. Gunnlaugsson
and J. Galliher,Wayward Icelanders: Punishment, Boundary Maintenance, and the Creation of Crime
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2001).
170 eg Interview with solicitor, 14 January 2003, interview with Solicitor, 28 June 2008.
171 Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for Northern Ireland, Audit Report (2003) at http://cja-
ni.courtsni.gov.uk/cjaniauditreport.pdf (last visited 28 January 2011); D. Feenan Applications by
Women for Silk and Judicial O⁄ce in Northern Ireland (Commissioner for Judicial Appointments for
Northern Ireland, 2005) at http://cjani.courtsni.gov.uk/CJANIResearchReport.pdf (last visited
28 January 2011); and https://www.nijac.org/publications/documents/research (last visited 28 Jan-
uary 2011). For example, Leith et al note that there are no female high court judges, and that
women make up only 21% of all judicial o⁄ce holders: P. Leith et al, Propensity toApply forJudicial
O⁄ce under the New Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments System (2008) at http://www.nijac.org/
publications/documents/research (last visited 28 January 2011) 37.
172 Interview barrister, 25 November 2003.
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was, byde¢nition, a key part of its armoury. Lawyerswho spoke out in defence of
the rule of law and against state abuses were by de¢nition criticising that
same state when it appeared to all intents and purposes to be ‘at war’with Repub-
licans who represented a direct challenge to its legitimacy.173 In a context where
‘loyalty’ to the state, however imagined, was a deeply engrained aspect
of the dominant culture, it is perhaps little wonder that many lawyers appeared
disinclined to criticise.174
This issue isworth exploring in a littlemore detail. A range of scholarswho focus
on the importance of law in the shaping of ethnocultural identities provide us with
an interesting literature on colonial andpost-colonial lawyering.175 Some of themost
insightful aspects of this work trace the importance of symbols and the in£uence of
legal education and legal ‘ways of thinking’ amongst lawyers trained in the traditions
of the British, French or other imperial powers.176 As Engle Merry has argued, the
cultural power of law was central to the colonial project and leaves a longstanding
legacy.177 Forobvious reasons one treads verycarefully in applying apostcolonial lens
to Northern Ireland.178 The deployment of any analytical framework to understand
political and violent struggles inevitably either resonates with or grates against the
competing interpretations of themacro-con£ict.Taking that danger as read, Iwould
still argue that there are important theoretical insights to be gained from this litera-
ture, regardless whether one regards the historical antecedents of the relationship
between Ireland and Britain as colonial or not.
At the symbolic level, as evidenced by the discussions above, historically at least
the ethos and culture of the legal system inNorthern Ireland appeared ‘more Brit-
ish than the British’. Prominent displays of theRoyal Coat of Arms on courts, the
£ying of theUnion £ag, and a declaration of ‘God Save the Queen’when a judge
entered the court were all much more common place than in England and
173 For a discussion on the legal and political implications of applying the ‘war’ concept to Northern
Ireland, see C. Campbell and I. Connolly,‘MakingWar onTerror? Global Lessons fromNorthern
Ireland’ (2006) 69MLR 935.
174 For the classic account of the relationship between loyalty and the state, see B. Anderson, Imagined
Communities: Re£ections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London:Verso, 2nd ed, 1991). For a
discussion on the Northern Ireland variant see H. Patterson and E. Kau¡man,Unionism andOran-
geism Since 1945:The Decline of the Loyal Family (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007).
175 See eg C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology (New York: Basic
Books, 3rd ed, 2000); M. Chanock, ‘The Lawyers’ Self: Sketches on Establishing a Professional
Identity in South Africa 1900^1925’ in R. McQueen andW. Pue (eds),MisplacedTraditions: British
Lawyers, Colonial Peoples (Annandale: Federation Press,1999);W. Pue,‘Cultural Projects and Struc-
tural Transformation in the Canadian Legal Profession’ in Sugarman and Pue, n 10 above;
A. Likhovski, Law and Identity in Mandate Palestine (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2006).
176 M. Shara¢,‘A NewHistory of Colonial Lawyering: Lihowski and Legal Identities’ (2007) 32 Law
and Social Inquiry 1059.
177 S. EngleMerry,ColonizingHawai’i:TheCultural Power of Law (Princeton, NJ: PrincetonUniversity
Press, 2000).
178 See S. Howe, Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in IrishHistory and Culture (Oxford: OxfordUni-
versity Press, 2000) esp ch 10, for a nuanced discussion. Interestingly Kotsonouris has argued that
the British in£uence on legal culture in Ireland has not been limited to Northern Ireland. She
makes the case that following partition in the South of Ireland, the Free State authorities to a large
extent aped the British colonial legal structures and processes as part of establishing the credibility
and legitimacy of the new nation state. M. Kotsonouris, Retreat from Revolution:The DaŁ il Courts
1920^1924 (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1994).
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Wales.179 This was a context inwhich the legal systemwas permeated by symbols
of exaggerated Britishness, what one prominent postcolonial scholar refers to as a
fetishisation of the colonial culture.180 The naturalisation and normalisation of
such an ethos in the fabric of the legal system and its representation as ‘neutral’ or
‘as if it were a natural consequence’181 in such a manifestly divided society under-
lines the extent to which lawyers who protested against unlawful actions of the
British state beyond the courts were indeed sticking their heads above the collec-
tive parapet.
Perhaps even more signi¢cant in terms of the local legal culture has been the
strength and durability of a largely positivistic outlookon lawwhich is alsomuch
associatedwith the British legal tradition. Paraphrasing Pue,Diceymay have been
more in£uential in the historical construction of colonial British identity than
either Rudyard Kipling orWilliam Shakespeare.182 A detailed treatise on the var-
ious meanings of legal positivism is beyond the scope of the current paper. How-
ever, as Hunt has described, amongst the key unarticulated premises of British
legal culture is the‘absolute, continuing and indivisible sovereigntyof Parliament’.
This premise creates a mindset in which courts are but neutral arbiters applying
legal rules and negates the reality that judges, and by extension lawyers, either in
the arguments they use or the activities they engage in, are actually involved in
value choices.183 As was noted above, the vast majority of anti-terrorist laws in
Northern Ireland’s history had express parliamentary approval. During the con-
£ict almost all law graduates in the jurisdiction, including the author, were edu-
cated into this Diceyean understanding of law and lawyering.The limitations of
this traditional ‘sovereign will of the people’ argument for Northern Ireland, as
Livingstone has argued, were illustrated by the political realities of one-party
Unionist rule from 1921^72 or the lack of any politically workable alternative to
direct rule from 1972^2000.184 Time and again in the ¢eldwork for this paper,
even some lawyers involved in the most controversial aspects of con£ict-related
work appeared unwilling to abstract from their experiences or to venture into
179 Interview with barrister, 23 June 2008. Criminal Justice Review Group, Review of the Criminal
Justice System in Northern Ireland (Belfast: HMSO, 2000) 184. This was a civil service led review
which included a number of independent advisors established under the Good Friday Agree-
ment. It recommended no change to the arrangements for displaying the Royal Coat of Arms
on the exterior of existing courthouses, but that the interior of the courts should be free from all
symbols, and that the practice of declaring God Save the Queen should cease. It also recom-
mended that the practice of £ying theUnion £ag could continue in line with £ag £ying practices
for other government buildings in Northern Ireland. By contrast, the Independent Commission
on Policing chaired by Lord Patten went much further. It recommended that all police stations
should be ‘neutral working environments’ which required that the Union £ag not be £own, the
changing of the name and badge of the Royal Ulster Constabulary and the removal of all por-
traits of the Queen from police stations. Independent Commission on Policing,The Report of the
Independent Commission on Policing for Northern Ireland (Belfast: HMSO, 2000) 99.
180 H. Bhabha,The Location of Culture (London: Routledge,1994) 91.
181 C.Wright Mills,The Sociological Imagination (Fortieth Anniversary Edition, NewYork: Oxford
University Press, 2000) 36.
182 W. Pue, ‘British Masculinities, Canadian Lawyers: Canadian Legal Education 1900^1930’ in
McQueen and Pue, n 175 above, 83.
183 M. Hunt, ‘The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal Profession’
(1999) 26 JLS 86, 92.
184 Livingstone, n 101 above,159^160.
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conversations concerning the politics of legality, preferring instead to limit dis-
cussions to judgments, doctrine, obiter and so forth. In such a legal culture, jok-
ingly described by one interviewee as ‘the law is the law is the law, no politics, no
context, just law’,185 it is not di⁄cult to see how moral choices became narrowed
exclusively to legal analysis, challenges to the status quo outside the courts were
viewed as ‘political’ and acquiescence became a byword for professional ‘neutral-
ity’.
A further issue to be noted in seeking to understand better the ways in which
lawyers responded to events in Northern Ireland is the question of timing. The
literature on critical junctures privileges the importance of time and timing. Simi-
larly in con£ict resolution and peacemaking scholarship there is signi¢cant atten-
tion to the notion of ‘ripeness’ which suggests essentially that a combination of
political, ideological, social or material factorsmay render a con£ict ready for reso-
lution.186 The EGMwhich saw the Law Society call for a public inquiry into the
murders of Finucane and Nelson and the Bar’s decision to support the change in
the Declaration for taking Silk both occurred a number of years after the IRA
and Loyalist cease¢res when the political transition was well underway. In the
same year as the cease¢res, the Law Society successfully mobilised in opposition
to a proposal that paramilitary suspects should not be permitted to secure a lawyer
of their own choosing but rather should be provided one from a list of govern-
ment approved legal representatives. Inmarked contrast to its earlier acquiescence,
the Law Society made their ‘implacable hostility’ clear (on the grounds that soli-
citors in such a system might be viewed with ‘total suspicion and hostility’) and
indeed also rejected a subsequent watered down scheme.187 In the face of such
legal opposition, impetus for the proposed changes gradually disappeared in the
context of dwindling numbers of paramilitary suspects. Of course, as with the
EGM and QCs challenge, this successful demonstration of collective power and
in£uence begs the obvious question whether such mobilisation of the main legal
collectives could only take placewhen societywas clearly emergingout of con£ict.
Disappointingly, in the Northern Ireland context, this would appear to have been
the case.
Geertz has famously argued that law represents a distinct way of ‘imagining
the real’.188 In a similar fashion the version of legal professionalism propagated
during the Northern Ireland con£ict was contingent and socially constructed ^
a useful ¢ction for a collective failure of moral courage. As others have
185 Interview with Northern Irish barrister, 2 August 2005.
186 See I. Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1989); P. Coleman et al,
‘Reconstructing Ripeness II: Models and Methods for Constructing Stakeholder Engagement
Across Protracted Divides’ (2008) 26 Con£ict Resolution Quarterly 1, 43.
187 Law Society,Response by the LawSociety ofNorthern Ireland to Proposals by Sir Louis Blom-Cooper, Inde-
pendent Inspector for the Holding Centres, For a Duty Solicitor Scheme for the Holding Centres in Northern
Ireland (Belfast: Law Society of Northern Ireland, 2004). L. Blom Cooper, Fifth Annual Report of
the Independent Commissioner for Holding Centres (Belfast: Independent Commission for Holding
Centres, 1997). There may also have been a degree of self interest in the position of the Law
Society. One newspaper article from the Belfast Telegraph, 16th March 1994, notes a comment
from the Law Society suggesting that Blom Cooper’s proposal could be ‘. . . a cynical means of
reducing the legal aid bill.’
188 Geertz, n 175 above,184.
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demonstrated, a culture of quietism amongst powerful players within the legal
community is not unique to Northern Ireland.189 As I have been at pains to point
out, most simply got onwith the business of lawyering while a small number of
individual lawyers and indeed sporadic groups also ‘spoke out’ bravely at what
they perceived as egregious human rights abuses. Often such lawyers were
marginalised, labelled trouble-makers and accused of undermining the political
neutrality of the profession.190 The marginalisation of such voices, and the collec-
tive silence of many of their colleagues was all the more impactive in Northern
Ireland precisely because it is such a small place. Together with doctors, lawyers
are the only profession with highly developed United Nations standards,
designed to protect their independence and underpin their professional authority.
Mobilised groups of lawyers bring what Bourdieu refers to as ‘symbolic capital’
to important political and social debates ^ ‘authority, knowledge, prestige, and
reputation’.191Correspondingly, their silence during such debates in the Northern
Ireland con£ict was deafening.
While a universally agreed account about the role of the legal profession in the
jurisdiction may be impossible, some e¡ort to systemically interrogate the past
would at least ‘narrow the space for permissible lies’.192 Skilled advocacy, courage
and integrity are an element of that history, but so too are the failures discussed
above. In South Africa, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) held
hearings into the conduct of the judicial and legal professions during the Apart-
heid era.Those hearings, described byTRC Chairperson ArchbishopTutu as ‘. . .
the most important of the professional hearings, almost as important as the vic-
tim/survivor hearings’,193 explored issues concerning the importance of judicial
independence, the ways in which parliamentary sovereignty was interpreted, the
integrity of the prosecution service, the role of the professional associations and
the treatment of those lawyers who did take public positions in opposition to
Emergency laws and other aspects of the Apartheid regime.While the levels of
cooperation and the outcomes were uneven, they did establish an important pre-
cedent. Northern Ireland has yet to resolve its protracted debate on how to deal
with its past.194 But when a process is settled upon, the themes explored in the
South AfricanTRC are a useful starting point.
I have argued elsewhere that there is a general tendency to oversell the healing
and reconciliatory power of truth recovery in the ¢eld of transitional justice.195 In
the case of the legal community however, the impetus towards a more rounded
appreciation of its history is not premised upon such intangible ^ though laudable
^ goals. Rather, it is based upon a pragmatic view that unless contemporary and
189 eg G. Barzilai,‘The Ambivalent Language of Lawyers in Israel: Liberal Politics, Economic Liber-
alism, Silence and Dissent’ in Halliday, n 17 above; D. Brinks,TheJudicial Response to PoliceViolence
in Latin America: Inequality and the Rule of Law (NewYork: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
190 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, n 118 above.
191 P. Bourdieu,Outline of aTheory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1977).
192 M. Ignatie¡,‘Articles of Faith’ (1996) 5 Index on Censorship 96,111.
193 Quoted in Dyzenhaus, n 11 above 26.
194 A. Du¡y,‘ATruth Commission for Northern Ireland?’ (2010) InternationalJournal ofTransitionalJus-
tice 4,1, 26.
195 K. McEvoy,TheTrouble withTruth: Struggling with the Past in Northern Ireland (London: Routledge,
2011).
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future lawyers know about, acknowledge and engagewith the challenges thrown
up by violent political con£ict, they cannot in fact do their jobs properly in
peacetime.196 As O’Donnell has argued, law matters in the consolidation of
democracy,197 but so do the values, mores and actions of the lawyers who
administer and mould it. The legal actors in Northern Ireland who sta¡ed key
institutions ^ including the universities ^ created and maintained a pervasive cul-
ture of quietism during the con£ict. Understanding their silence is a fundamental
requirement for a properly embedded rule of law and amore grounded notion of
legal professionalism.
196 For example, drawing from successful experiences in theUnited States and South Africa, a major
funder has recently established a Public Interest Litigation Support organisation in Northern Ire-
land designed to fund strategic litigation, promote pro-bonowork, explore the barriers to public
interest litigation and promote access to justice of those in need. E¡orts to promote this as a local
variant of ‘cause-lawyering’ can only be realised with a proper understanding of the historical
context and legal culture explored herein. See http://www.pilsni.org (last visited 28 January
2011).
197 G. O’Donnell,‘Why the Rule of LawMatters’ (2004) 15 Journal of Democracy 4, 32.
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